The report said the fire started outside on a patio. Was there no dry
sprinkler on the patio? Apparently not.
If the fire started outside and involved exterior siding, spreading along the
outside of the building, the growth and intensity at some point would breach
the building envelope and even if the sprinklers were operational, a 13R system
would have probably been overwhelmed.
When were the sprinkler systems last inspected and what was the actual
municipal water supply capable of providing at the time of the fire versus when
the system designed?
And no mention of whether or not there were smoke detectors?
Craig L. Prahl
Fire Protection Group Lead/SME
Direct - 864.920.7540
Fax - 864.920.7129
Direct Extension 77540
CH2M is now Jacobs.
200 Verdae Blvd.
Greenville, SC 29607
From: Sprinklerforum [mailto:sprinklerforum-boun...@lists.firesprinkler.org] On
Behalf Of bcasterl...@fsc-inc.com
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 10:26 PM
Subject: Re: PA nursing home fire with multiple fatalities [EXTERNAL]
the challenge for the 'up-and-coming'
i love you scot
Quoting "å... ...." <eurekaig...@gmail.com>:
> Consider the waterflow test really was 90 psig static, 20 psig
> residual and
> 363 gpm.
> If the fire started outside, the elevation pressure loss to operating
> sprinklers is minimal (~ 4.5 psig); therefore enough water pressure
> remains to operate a handful of sprinklers.
> And a handful of sprinklers is ordinarily enough to control a fire; if
> the fire started inside...
> 1. Combustible exterior though, could have contributed to flame spread.
> 2. If the water department was motivated to upgrade their water
> supply, then there probably was something seriously lacking in their
> product delivery.
> If we can determine if it was the fire pump operator (engineer) whom
> declared "...there is no water at the scene!" this points a finger at
> the underground water supply.
> 3. The control valve to the personal care section of the facility
> could have been off, but this facility had multiple risers, each with
> its own control valve; even if the personal care system control valve
> was closed, other CVs to other sprinkler systems should have been open
> and capable of delivering water, which again points to lack of municipal
> water supply.
> 4. If the control valve to the BFP was closed, then all sprinkler
> systems would not be delivering water via the city pressurized
> underground pipes, but the FDC should still have been able to deliver
> water to the individual sprinkler systems as it should be connected
> downstream of the backflow preventer. So if water from the FDC was
> not reaching the systems, this again implicates the municipal water
> 5. Was there a water leak in the municipal supply that prompted the
> municipal water department to restrict some valves?
> 6. Was the sprinkler system to the personal care wing a dry-pipe
> system, and impaired due to corrosion?
> Usually it takes more than one system (items 1 through 6) to fail in
> order to create a significant tragedy.
> It is sad to learn of this tragedy. It is hoped that once
> what-was-wanting with these fire suppression systems is identified,
> these will not be soon repeated.
> Scot Deal
> Excelsior Risk and Fire Engineering
> gsm: +420 606 981 266 <+420%20606%20981%20266> GMT + 1
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