Amos,

For your information, sslcrtvalidator_program is also not compatible with 
TLS1.3.
We have done dozen of tests and we only get TLS1.2 information with 
sslcrtvalidator_program.

My « question-conclusion » «  could be ridiculous but the imcompability is here 
a fact, sorry for that.
Instead a PHP helper we have build a C++ helper (300 lines including comments) 
and we can also work with TLS1.3 by using basis OpenSSL functions, we suppose 
the same the Squid uses…

PS : OpenSSL is the same we use to compile Squid 5.7.

Ye Fred

De : squid-users [mailto:squid-users-boun...@lists.squid-cache.org] De la part 
de David Touzeau
Envoyé : samedi 19 novembre 2022 19:19
À : squid-users@lists.squid-cache.org
Objet : [SPAM] Re: [squid-users] Squid 5: server_cert_fingerprint not working 
fine...

Thanks Amos for this clarification,

We also have the same needs and indeed, we face with the same approach.

It is possible that the structure of Squid could not, in some cases, recovering 
this type of information.
Although the concept of a proxy is neither more nor less than a big browser 
that surfs instead of the client browsers.

The SHA1 and certificate information reception are very valuable because it 
ensures better detection of compromised sites (many malicious sites use the 
same information in their certificates).
This allows detecting "nests" of malicious sites automatically.

Unfortunately, there is madness in the approach to security, there is a race to 
strengthen the security of tunnels (produced by Google and browsers vendors).
What is the advantage of encrypting wikipedia and Youtube channels?

On the other hand, it is crucial to look inside these streams to detect threats.
This is antinomic...

So TLS 1.3 and soon the use of QUIC with UDP 80/443 will make use of a proxy 
useless as these features are rolled out  (trust Google to motivate them)
Unless the proxy manages to follow this protocol madness race...

For this reason, firewall manufacturers propose the use of client software that 
fills the gap of protocol visibility in their gateway products or you -can see 
a growth of workstation protections , such EDR concept

Just an ideological and non-technical approach...

Regards
Le 19/11/2022 à 16:50, Amos Jeffries a écrit :
On 19/11/2022 2:55 am, UnveilTech - Support wrote:

Hi Amos,

We have tested with a "ssl_bump bump" ("ssl_bump all" and "ssl_bump bump 
sslstep1"), it does not solve the problem.
According to Alex, we can also confirm it's a bug with Squid 5.x and TLS 1.3.

Okay.


It seems Squid is only compatible with TLS 1.2, it's not good for the future...

One bug (or lack of ability) does not make the entire protocol "incompatible". 
It only affects people trying to do the particular buggy action.
Unfortunately for you (and others) it happens to be accessing this server cert 
fingerprint.

I/we have been clear from the beginning that *when used properly* TLS/SSL 
cannot be "bump"ed - that is true for all versions of TLS and SSL before it. In 
that same "bump" use-case the server does not provide *any* details, it just 
rejects the proxy attempted connection. In some paranoid security environments 
the server can reject even for "splice" when the clientHello is passed on 
unchanged by the proxy. HTTPS use on the web is typically *neither* of those 
"proper" setups so SSL-Bump "bump" in general works and "splice" almost always.

Cheers
Amos

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