Stephen Gallagher wrote:
> On 04/16/2010 09:36 AM, Simo Sorce wrote:
>   
>> On Fri, 16 Apr 2010 13:51:49 +0200
>> Sumit Bose<sb...@redhat.com>  wrote:
>>
>>     
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> the IPA provider has its own set of config options:
>>>
>>> - ipa_domain
>>> - ipa_server
>>> - ipa_hostname
>>>
>>> in the most simple case only ipa_server is needed. (If we can resolve
>>> service records we wouldn't even need this.)
>>>
>>> Behind the scenes the IPA provider is the LDAP identity provider glued
>>> together with the Kerberos authentication/change password provider and
>>> an IPA specific access provider.
>>>
>>> The options for the LDAP and Kerberos provider are set to defaults
>>> that will work with an IPAv2 server in a secure way.
>>>
>>> As documented in the man page it is possible to set LDAP or Kerberos
>>> specific options to override the defaults set by the IPA provider.
>>> While this makes sense e.g. for the timeout options there are other
>>> cases, especially for the LDAP provider, where is doesn't. So it is
>>> possible to set ldap_id_use_start_tls to true which is kind of
>>> useless and has performance penalties, because the communication is
>>> already protected by GSSAPI. Or it would be possible to disable
>>> GSSAPI by setting ldap_sasl_mech to none.
>>>
>>> So the question arises how to handle this situation?
>>> - Shall we keep everything as it is and only update the man page to
>>>    underline that the default configuration is secure and you really
>>> only need the ipa_* options?
>>>       
>> This would probably be a good idea.
>>
>>     
>>> - Shall we stop parsing ldap_* and krb5_* options and introduce ipa_*
>>>    options for timeouts and other useful options?
>>>       
>> No, I think it would cause a lot more issues, as we will certainly
>> forget to create/modify the corresponding ipa_ options when we
>> create/modify ldap_ or krb5_ options.
>>
>> I think we shouldn't shoot ourselves in the feet just because we fear
>> someone is going to misconfigure their installation.
>> Very persistent users would always be able to misconfigure their system
>> anyway :)
>>
>>     
>>> - Shall we start reading the config from the IPA server only?
>>>       
>> At some point we want to read the config out of the IPA server, but we
>> want to keep reading local options as "overrides".
>>
>>     
>>> - Shall we do sometime completely different?
>>>       
>> I think this is a thunderstorm in a tea cup :-)
>> We should reasonably prevent users from shooting their feet, but this
>> is going beyond that. Let's just make it clear in the docs that a
>> normal installation doesn't require to specify any ldap_ or krb5_
>> options to operate correctly. If a user insists then they will get what
>> they ask for.
>>
>> Simo.
>>
>>     
>
> Simo makes some strong arguments. I think he's right that we should just 
> be more clear in the manpages and leave things as-is.
>
>
>   
+1

-- 
Thank you,
Dmitri Pal

Engineering Manager IPA project,
Red Hat Inc.


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