On 10/21/2015 03:19 PM, Petr Cech wrote:
On 10/12/2015 11:37 AM, Jakub Hrozek wrote:
> From a15acee2495ee12190e711f3344e14c54fc73062 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Petr Cech<pc...@redhat.com>
>Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2015 08:57:15 -0400
>Subject: [PATCH 10/11] KRB5_CHILD: More restrictive umask
>
>We could use more restrictive umask in krb5_child. I found out that
>there is directory creation, but it is done by create_ccache_dir()
>which has its own umask setup.
>
>Resolves:
>https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2424
>---
>  src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
>diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
>index
69b7687188c04498f6ef7c10a1b5ca602daca8ef..be8db23df4660adcb59fcd2677b28ee415cd18d8
100644
>--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
>+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
>@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static krb5_error_code create_ccache(char
*ccname, krb5_creds *creds)
>  #endif
>
>      /* Set a restrictive umask, just in case we end up creating
any file */
>-    umask(SSS_DFL_X_UMASK);
>+    umask(SSS_DFL_UMASK);
I think this change is OK, as you say, the directories might need the
executable flag, but then the directory-creating code should make sure
the permissions are more relaxed..
I checked it again. It is OK.


btw I tested both FILE ccache:
     krb5_ccname_template =FILE:/tmp/ccache_%p.XXXXXX
the result looked OK to me:
     # ll /tmp/ccache_ad...@ipa.test.KDaxgn
     -rw-------. 1 admin admins 1041 Oct 12 09:14
/tmp/ccache_ad...@ipa.test.KDaxgn
and DIR ccache:
     krb5_ccname_template = DIR:/tmp/ccaches/ccache_%p
also looked good:
     # ll -d/tmp/ccaches/
     drwx------. 3 admin admins 4096 Oct 12 09:31/tmp/ccaches/
     # ll -d/tmp/ccaches/ccache_ad...@ipa.test/
     drwx------. 2 admin admins 4096 Oct 12
09:31/tmp/ccaches/ccache_ad...@ipa.test/
     # ll /tmp/ccaches/ccache_ad...@ipa.test
     -rw-------. 1 admin admins   10 Oct 12 09:31 primary
     -rw-------. 1 admin admins 1041 Oct 12 09:31 tktrg2WYD

>
>      /* we create a new context here as the main process one may
have been
>       * opened as root and contain possibly references (even open
handles ?)
>--
>2.4.3
>
> From 6085c5ce86e6ba79f29d2c18f6fceca9bab5cecb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Petr Cech<pc...@redhat.com>
>Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2015 09:32:12 -0400
>Subject: [PATCH 11/11] UTILS: Removing SSS_DFL_X UMASK constant
077 is still used in sss_unique_file(). So we can either use SSS_DFL_X
umask there or convert to non-executable umask. Either way, I think it's
OK to keep SSS_DFL_X even though it's unused right now for later use.
It's just a constant.
OK, SSS_DFL_X_UMASK is still here, but not used in code.


sss_unique_file is used to generate kdcinfo files, where non-x would be
OK because later we fchmod to 644 anyway:
      ret = fchmod(fd, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IROTH);

..and also used in gpo_cache_store_file() which uses the same pattern..

I rewrote DFL_X to DFL in sss_unique_file().

...then also in sss_unique_filename() which is used to create dummy
keytabs in ipa_server_trusted_dom_setup_1way(), handle_randomized() and
ldap_child_get_tgt_sync(). Now:
     - ipa_server_trusted_dom_setup_1way() - safe to change, we only
use it
     to get a unique filename, the contents are filled with ipa-getkeytab
     - handle_randomized() - safe to change, libkrb5 unlinks the unique
       file later, so we just really need the filename
     - ldap_child_get_tgt_sync() - ditto, only used as input for
       krb5_cc_resolve()

The third patch is about redudant constant.

And at the end, there are may uses of umask() in CI tests, which I leave
how they are. They could be test relevant. Maybe I will touch it in some
future patch.

The last umask like constant is 644, which is connected to chmod(),
open(), etc. Do we want to have a constant for it?

Regards

Petr


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