Thanks for the continued sendmail support!   One question, I noticed the new mc file makes the following changes which refers to a file that does not normally exist on RELENG_13.  What is the best way to generate that file ?

 diff -u sendmail.cf build13.sentex.ca.cf
--- sendmail.cf 2024-02-07 18:54:29.649479000 +0000
+++ build13.sentex.ca.cf        2024-02-07 18:55:15.546923000 +0000
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #####  $Id: cfhead.m4,v 8.122 2013-11-22 20:51:13 ca Exp $  #####
 #####  $Id: cf.m4,v 8.33 2013-11-22 20:51:13 ca Exp $  #####

+#####  $FreeBSD$  #####

 #####  $Id: freebsd6.m4,v 1.2 2013-11-22 20:51:15 ca Exp $  #####

@@ -606,7 +607,7 @@
 # Directory containing hashes pointing to certificate revocation status files
 #O CRLPath
 # DHParameters (only required if DSA/DH is used)
-#O DHParameters
+O DHParameters=/etc/mail/certs/dh.param
 # Random data source (required for systems without /dev/urandom under OpenSSL)
 #O RandFile
 # fingerprint algorithm (digest) to use for the presented cert

Feb  7 18:56:00 build13 sm-mta[88899]: starting daemon (8.18.1): SMTP+queueing@00:30:00 Feb  7 18:56:00 build13 sm-mta[88899]: STARTTLS=server: file /etc/mail/certs/dh.param unsafe: No such file or directory Feb  7 18:56:00 build13 sm-msp-queue[88902]: starting daemon (8.18.1): queueing@00:30:00


On 2/7/2024 2:54 AM, Gregory Shapiro wrote:
As noted in UPDATING:

20240207:
        sendmail 8.18.1 has been imported and merged.  This version enforces
        stricter RFC compliance by default, especially with respect to line
        endings.  This may cause issues with receiving messages from
        non-compliant MTAs; please see the first 8.18.1 release note in
        contrib/sendmail/RELEASE_NOTES for mitigations.

Here is that release note entry:

8.18.1/8.18.1   2024/01/31
        sendmail is now stricter in following the RFCs and rejects
                some invalid input with respect to line endings
                and pipelining:
                - Prevent transaction stuffing by ensuring SMTP clients
                wait for the HELO/EHLO and DATA response before sending
                further SMTP commands.  This can be disabled using
                the new srv_features option 'F'.  Issue reported by
                Yepeng Pan and Christian Rossow from CISPA Helmholtz
                Center for Information Security.
                - Accept only CRLF . CRLF as end of an SMTP message
                as required by the RFCs, which can disabled by the
                new srv_features option 'O'.
                - Do not accept a CR or LF except in the combination
                CRLF (as required by the RFCs).  These checks can
                be disabled by the new srv_features options
                'U' and 'G', respectively.  In this case it is
                suggested to use 'u2' and 'g2' instead so the server
                replaces offending bare CR or bare LF with a space.
                It is recommended to only turn these protections off
                for trusted networks due to the potential for abuse.


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