2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------ From: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]> commit 405707985594169cfd0b1d97d29fcb4b4c6f2ac9 upstream. The FBIOGET_VBLANK device ioctl allows unprivileged users to read 16 bytes of uninitialized stack memory, because the "reserved" member of the fb_vblank struct declared on the stack is not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user. This patch takes care of it. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andy Walls <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- drivers/media/video/ivtv/ivtvfb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/media/video/ivtv/ivtvfb.c +++ b/drivers/media/video/ivtv/ivtvfb.c @@ -460,6 +460,8 @@ static int ivtvfb_ioctl(struct fb_info * struct fb_vblank vblank; u32 trace; + memset(&vblank, 0, sizeof(struct fb_vblank)); + vblank.flags = FB_VBLANK_HAVE_COUNT |FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VCOUNT | FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VSYNC; trace = read_reg(0x028c0) >> 16; _______________________________________________ stable mailing list [email protected] http://linux.kernel.org/mailman/listinfo/stable
