2.6.36-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Nelson Elhage <[email protected]>

commit 33dd94ae1ccbfb7bf0fb6c692bc3d1c4269e6177 upstream.

If a user manages to trigger an oops with fs set to KERNEL_DS, fs is not
otherwise reset before do_exit().  do_exit may later (via mm_release in
fork.c) do a put_user to a user-controlled address, potentially allowing
a user to leverage an oops into a controlled write into kernel memory.

This is only triggerable in the presence of another bug, but this
potentially turns a lot of DoS bugs into privilege escalations, so it's
worth fixing.  I have proof-of-concept code which uses this bug along
with CVE-2010-3849 to write a zero to an arbitrary kernel address, so
I've tested that this is not theoretical.

A more logical place to put this fix might be when we know an oops has
occurred, before we call do_exit(), but that would involve changing
every architecture, in multiple places.

Let's just stick it in do_exit instead.

[[email protected]: update code comment]
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

---
 kernel/exit.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -903,6 +903,15 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
        if (unlikely(!tsk->pid))
                panic("Attempted to kill the idle task!");
 
+       /*
+        * If do_exit is called because this processes oopsed, it's possible
+        * that get_fs() was left as KERNEL_DS, so reset it to USER_DS before
+        * continuing. Amongst other possible reasons, this is to prevent
+        * mm_release()->clear_child_tid() from writing to a user-controlled
+        * kernel address.
+        */
+       set_fs(USER_DS);
+
        tracehook_report_exit(&code);
 
        validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);


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