Hi,
CVE-2010-3705 is unfixed in the 2.6.32 longterm kernels:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-3705

Fixed in mainline in 51e97a12bef19b7e43199fc153cf9bd5f2140362
The patch (attached) has been in Debian Squeeze since 2010-10-15.

It's not needed for 2.6.36 (already present)

Cheers,
        Moritz



commit 51e97a12bef19b7e43199fc153cf9bd5f2140362
Author: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Date:   Fri Oct 1 11:51:47 2010 +0000

    sctp: Fix out-of-bounds reading in sctp_asoc_get_hmac()
    
    The sctp_asoc_get_hmac() function iterates through a peer's hmac_ids
    array and attempts to ensure that only a supported hmac entry is
    returned.  The current code fails to do this properly - if the last id
    in the array is out of range (greater than SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX), the
    id integer remains set after exiting the loop, and the address of an
    out-of-bounds entry will be returned and subsequently used in the parent
    function, causing potentially ugly memory corruption.  This patch resets
    the id integer to 0 on encountering an invalid id so that NULL will be
    returned after finishing the loop if no valid ids are found.
    
    Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
    Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
    Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c
index 8636639..ddbbf7c 100644
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -543,16 +543,20 @@ struct sctp_hmac *sctp_auth_asoc_get_hmac(const struct sctp_association *asoc)
 		id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
 
 		/* Check the id is in the supported range */
-		if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX)
+		if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) {
+			id = 0;
 			continue;
+		}
 
 		/* See is we support the id.  Supported IDs have name and
 		 * length fields set, so that we can allocated and use
 		 * them.  We can safely just check for name, for without the
 		 * name, we can't allocate the TFM.
 		 */
-		if (!sctp_hmac_list[id].hmac_name)
+		if (!sctp_hmac_list[id].hmac_name) {
+			id = 0;
 			continue;
+		}
 
 		break;
 	}
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