CAN information leak
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-4565
commit 9f260e0efa4766e56d0ac14f1aeea6ee5eb8fe83
Author: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Date: Sun Dec 26 06:54:53 2010 +0000
CAN: Use inode instead of kernel address for /proc file
Since the socket address is just being used as a unique identifier, its
inode number is an alternative that does not leak potentially sensitive
information.
CC-ing stable because MITRE has assigned CVE-2010-4565 to the issue.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index 6faa825..9d5e8ac 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ struct bcm_sock {
struct list_head tx_ops;
unsigned long dropped_usr_msgs;
struct proc_dir_entry *bcm_proc_read;
- char procname [20]; /* pointer printed in ASCII with \0 */
+ char procname [32]; /* inode number in decimal with \0 */
};
static inline struct bcm_sock *bcm_sk(const struct sock *sk)
@@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ static int bcm_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len,
if (proc_dir) {
/* unique socket address as filename */
- sprintf(bo->procname, "%p", sock);
+ sprintf(bo->procname, "%lu", sock_i_ino(sk));
bo->bcm_proc_read = proc_create_data(bo->procname, 0644,
proc_dir,
&bcm_proc_fops, sk);
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