2.6.38-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------ From: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]> commit 78b79876761b86653df89c48a7010b5cbd41a84a upstream. Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -1261,6 +1261,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void _ /* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -1805,6 +1806,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -2034,6 +2036,7 @@ do_ipt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, ret = -EFAULT; break; } + rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0; if (cmd == IPT_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET) target = 1; _______________________________________________ stable mailing list [email protected] http://linux.kernel.org/mailman/listinfo/stable
