2.6.27.59-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------ From: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]> commit 9f260e0efa4766e56d0ac14f1aeea6ee5eb8fe83 upstream. Since the socket address is just being used as a unique identifier, its inode number is an alternative that does not leak potentially sensitive information. CC-ing stable because MITRE has assigned CVE-2010-4565 to the issue. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- net/can/bcm.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) Index: longterm-2.6.27/net/can/bcm.c =================================================================== --- longterm-2.6.27.orig/net/can/bcm.c 2011-01-29 11:22:46.000000000 +0100 +++ longterm-2.6.27/net/can/bcm.c 2011-04-25 17:20:40.456278152 +0200 @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ struct list_head tx_ops; unsigned long dropped_usr_msgs; struct proc_dir_entry *bcm_proc_read; - char procname [20]; /* pointer printed in ASCII with \0 */ + char procname [32]; /* inode number in decimal with \0 */ }; static inline struct bcm_sock *bcm_sk(const struct sock *sk) @@ -1479,7 +1479,7 @@ if (proc_dir) { /* unique socket address as filename */ - sprintf(bo->procname, "%p", sock); + sprintf(bo->procname, "%lu", sock_i_ino(sk)); bo->bcm_proc_read = create_proc_read_entry(bo->procname, 0644, proc_dir, bcm_read_proc, sk); _______________________________________________ stable mailing list [email protected] http://linux.kernel.org/mailman/listinfo/stable
