This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io

to the 2.6.32-longterm tree which can be found at:
    
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/longterm/longterm-queue-2.6.32.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     proc-restrict-access-to-proc-pid-io.patch
and it can be found in the queue-2.6.32 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the 2.6.32 longterm 
tree,
please let <sta...@kernel.org> know about it.


>From 1d1221f375c94ef961ba8574ac4f85c8870ddd51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <seg...@openwall.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2011 16:08:38 +0400
Subject: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io

From: Vasiliy Kulikov <seg...@openwall.com>

commit 1d1221f375c94ef961ba8574ac4f85c8870ddd51 upstream.

/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information.  E.g.  for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length.  Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.

ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <seg...@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@suse.de>

---
 fs/proc/base.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2454,6 +2454,9 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_
        struct task_io_accounting acct = task->ioac;
        unsigned long flags;
 
+       if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+               return -EACCES;
+
        if (whole && lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
                struct task_struct *t = task;
 
@@ -2575,7 +2578,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_
        REG("coredump_filter", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, 
proc_coredump_filter_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
-       INF("io",       S_IRUGO, proc_tgid_io_accounting),
+       INF("io",       S_IRUSR, proc_tgid_io_accounting),
 #endif
 };
 
@@ -2910,7 +2913,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_s
        REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
-       INF("io",       S_IRUGO, proc_tid_io_accounting),
+       INF("io",       S_IRUSR, proc_tid_io_accounting),
 #endif
 };
 


Patches currently in longterm-queue-2.6.32 which might be from 
seg...@openwall.com are

/home/gregkh/linux/longterm/longterm-queue-2.6.32/queue-2.6.32/proc-restrict-access-to-proc-pid-io.patch
/home/gregkh/linux/longterm/longterm-queue-2.6.32/queue-2.6.32/staging-comedi-fix-infoleak-to-userspace.patch

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