The patch titled
     Subject: sysctl: fix write access to dmesg_restrict/kptr_restrict
has been added to the -mm tree.  Its filename is
     sysctl-fix-write-access-to-dmesg_restrict-kptr_restrict.patch

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------------------------------------------------------
From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Subject: sysctl: fix write access to dmesg_restrict/kptr_restrict

Commit bfdc0b4 ("sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict") adds
code to restrict access to dmesg_restrict, however, it incorrectly alters
kptr_restrict rather than dmesg_restrict.

The original patch from Richard Weinberger
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/3/14/362) alters dmesg_restrict as expected,
and so the patch seems to have been misapplied.

This adds the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check to both dmesg_restrict and
kptr_restrict, since both are sensitive.

Reported-by: Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
---

 kernel/sysctl.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff -puN 
kernel/sysctl.c~sysctl-fix-write-access-to-dmesg_restrict-kptr_restrict 
kernel/sysctl.c
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c~sysctl-fix-write-access-to-dmesg_restrict-kptr_restrict
+++ a/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
-static int proc_dmesg_restrict(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
                                void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t 
*ppos);
 #endif
 
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
                .data           = &dmesg_restrict,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0644,
-               .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+               .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
                .extra1         = &zero,
                .extra2         = &one,
        },
@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
                .data           = &kptr_restrict,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0644,
-               .proc_handler   = proc_dmesg_restrict,
+               .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
                .extra1         = &zero,
                .extra2         = &two,
        },
@@ -1943,7 +1943,7 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
-static int proc_dmesg_restrict(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
                                void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
        if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
_
Subject: Subject: sysctl: fix write access to dmesg_restrict/kptr_restrict

Patches currently in -mm which might be from [email protected] are

linux-next.patch
sysctl-fix-write-access-to-dmesg_restrict-kptr_restrict.patch
fs-symlink-restrictions-on-sticky-directories.patch
fs-hardlink-creation-restrictions.patch
fs-proc-introduce-proc-pid-task-tid-children-entry-v9.patch
c-r-procfs-add-arg_start-end-env_start-end-and-exit_code-members-to-proc-pid-stat.patch
c-r-prctl-extend-pr_set_mm-to-set-up-more-mm_struct-entries-v2.patch
c-r-prctl-add-ability-to-set-new-mm_struct-exe_file.patch
ramoops-use-pstore-interface.patch
ramoops-use-pstore-interface-fix.patch

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