commit: 92f28d973cce45ef5823209aab3138eb45d8b349 From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2013 01:03:33 -0700 Subject: scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Don't allow spoofing pids over unix domain sockets in the corner cases where a user has created a user namespace but has not yet created a pid namespace. Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> --- net/core/scm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c index 905dcc6..2dc6cda 100644 --- a/net/core/scm.c +++ b/net/core/scm.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/pid.h> #include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -52,7 +53,8 @@ static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds) if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid)) return -EINVAL; - if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) && + if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || + ns_capable(current->nsproxy->pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) && ((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) && ((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) || -- 1.7.10.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe stable" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
