The patch titled
Subject: kmsg: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
kmsg-honor-dmesg_restrict-sysctl-on-dev-kmsg.patch
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*** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated
there every 3-4 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
Subject: kmsg: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
The dmesg_restrict sysctl currently covers the syslog method for access
dmesg, however /dev/kmsg isn't covered by the same protections. Most
people haven't noticed because util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to using the
syslog method for access in older versions. With util-linux dmesg(1)
defaults to reading directly from /dev/kmsg.
Fix this by reworking all of the access methods to use the
check_syslog_permissions function and adding checks to devkmsg_open and
devkmsg_read.
Addresses https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=903192
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Christian Kujau <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
---
kernel/printk.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff -puN kernel/printk.c~kmsg-honor-dmesg_restrict-sysctl-on-dev-kmsg
kernel/printk.c
--- a/kernel/printk.c~kmsg-honor-dmesg_restrict-sysctl-on-dev-kmsg
+++ a/kernel/printk.c
@@ -362,6 +362,46 @@ static void log_store(int facility, int
log_next_seq++;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+int dmesg_restrict = 1;
+#else
+int dmesg_restrict;
+#endif
+
+static int syslog_action_restricted(int type)
+{
+ if (dmesg_restrict)
+ return 1;
+ /* Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size" for
everybody */
+ return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && type !=
SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER;
+}
+
+static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file)
+{
+ /*
+ * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've
+ * already done the capabilities checks at open time.
+ */
+ if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN)
+ goto ok;
+
+ if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) {
+ if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
+ goto ok;
+ /* For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with a
warning */
+ if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
+ "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
+ "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n",
+ current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+ goto ok;
+ }
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ok:
+ return security_syslog(type);
+}
+
/* /dev/kmsg - userspace message inject/listen interface */
struct devkmsg_user {
u64 seq;
@@ -437,10 +477,16 @@ static ssize_t devkmsg_read(struct file
char cont = '-';
size_t len;
ssize_t ret;
+ int err;
if (!user)
return -EBADF;
+ err = check_syslog_permissions(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL,
+ SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&user->lock);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -619,7 +665,7 @@ static int devkmsg_open(struct inode *in
if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY)
return 0;
- err = security_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL);
+ err = check_syslog_permissions(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -812,45 +858,6 @@ static inline void boot_delay_msec(int l
}
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
-int dmesg_restrict = 1;
-#else
-int dmesg_restrict;
-#endif
-
-static int syslog_action_restricted(int type)
-{
- if (dmesg_restrict)
- return 1;
- /* Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size" for
everybody */
- return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && type !=
SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER;
-}
-
-static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file)
-{
- /*
- * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've
- * already done the capabilities checks at open time.
- */
- if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN)
- return 0;
-
- if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) {
- if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
- return 0;
- /* For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with a
warning */
- if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
- printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
- "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
- "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n",
- current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
- return 0;
- }
- return -EPERM;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
#if defined(CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME)
static bool printk_time = 1;
#else
@@ -1126,10 +1133,6 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf
if (error)
goto out;
- error = security_syslog(type);
- if (error)
- return error;
-
switch (type) {
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
break;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from [email protected] are
origin.patch
mkcapflagspl-convert-to-mkcapflagssh.patch
headers_installpl-convert-to-headers_installsh.patch
kmsg-honor-dmesg_restrict-sysctl-on-dev-kmsg.patch
aio-fix-kioctx-not-being-freed-after-cancellation-at-exit-time.patch
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