3.8.13.10 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> commit aee1c13dd0f6c2fc56e0e492b349ee8ac655880f upstream. Don't allow mounting the proc filesystem unless the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN rights over the pid namespace. The principle here is if you create or have capabilities over it you can mount it, otherwise you get to live with what other people have mounted. Andy pointed out that this is needed to prevent users in a user namespace from remounting proc and specifying different hidepid and gid options on already existing proc mounts. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]> --- fs/proc/root.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c index 9c7fab1..411068e 100644 --- a/fs/proc/root.c +++ b/fs/proc/root.c @@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, ns = task_active_pid_ns(current); options = data; - if (!current_user_ns()->may_mount_proc) + if (!current_user_ns()->may_mount_proc || + !ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); } -- 1.8.1.2 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe stable" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
