This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
to the 3.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <[email protected]> know about it.
>From a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 23:09:58 -0400
Subject: auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
commit a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41 upstream.
Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
audit rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow...
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -868,6 +868,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_tas
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
+static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
+{
+ int word, bit;
+
+ if (val > 0xffffffff)
+ return false;
+
+ word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
+ if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
+ return false;
+
+ bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
+
+ return rule->mask[word] & bit;
+}
+
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
@@ -885,11 +901,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_sys
rcu_read_lock();
if (!list_empty(list)) {
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
&state, false)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -909,20 +922,16 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_sys
static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_names *n,
struct audit_context *ctx) {
- int word, bit;
int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
struct audit_entry *e;
enum audit_state state;
- word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
if (list_empty(list))
return 0;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
ctx->current_state = state;
return 1;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are
queue-3.4/auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch
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