Ian Paterson wrote: > Kevin Smith wrote: >> On 11 Sep 2007, at 17:20, Ian Paterson wrote: >>> Even where TLS is available, SASL PLAIN requires server operators to >>> keep copies of all users' passwords. This is a serious (and often >>> unnecessary) security weakness. >> >> I'm not sure that's true; the server could hash the password still, >> both in storage and at the end of the wire. It doesn't help against a >> compromised server that's still accepting connections, but the >> passwords don't need to be stored plaintext afaics. > > Yes, sorry everyone who corrected me. That was my silly error (lack of > sleep). > > In real life servers will always be compromised (especially in cases > where the attacker is the service provider). So SASL PLAIN still > contains a serious vulnerability that is easily fixed in those cases > where DIGEST-MD5 is a practical option.
Except that DIGEST-MD5 is effectively being deprecated by the IETF. Thus the interest in SCRAM, YAP, and their ilk. Peter -- Peter Saint-Andre https://stpeter.im/
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