-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 6/13/13 8:40 AM, Matt Miller wrote: > > On Jun 12, 2013, at 8:41 PM, Peter Saint-Andre > <[email protected]> wrote: > >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 >> >> On 6/6/13 6:40 AM, Matthew Wild wrote: >>> On 6 June 2013 10:21, Simon Tennant <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>>> End to end encryption is a worth goal. This is very cool for >>>> getting information on the s2s connection. >>> >>> Perhaps on first sight. However this kind of usage is exactly >>> why the XEP died last time around. It isn't suitable for >>> anything except purely informational/debugging purposes. This >>> is because the link can change - it might be encrypted when >>> you check it, and then reconnect unencrypted without you >>> knowing. Also, malicious entities can always lie. >> >> What I'd like is to know whether the connection from my personal >> IM server (stpeter.im) or my company's IM server (say, >> cisco.com) to a random server like prosody.im or jabber.ietf.org >> is encrypted. Sure, malicious entities can lie, but I try not to >> create accounts or authenticate with malicious servers. :-) Look, >> I need to have *some* level of trust in the server I authenticate >> with. I just want to know if the path from there to the next >> server is encrypted, too. If I'm a server admin presumably I have >> some kind of server-side tool I can use, but that's not the case >> if I'm not an admin. > > > I don't disagree that the user is trusting their server by logging > in. And if this check were to stop at "my.domain --> > other.domain", then I can see some confidence in the results > because of the trust. Changes in the state *could* be dealt with by > making this information available in a pubsub-like manner (I sensed > the collective shudder from some of our server developers and > operators before I even typed that sentence (-: ). > > However, that trust doesn't carry over to the answer for > "other.domain --> [email protected]" which users will want so > very, very desperately. > > I don't necessarily have a problem with this as a protocol-level > diagnostic tool; it can help users (or rather, the developers of > the client the user interacts with) and admins to troubleshoot. > But the potential of abuse and over-interpretation is extremely > high.
Yes, that is true, and I too don't want people to read more into the results than is justified. I will keep that very much in mind as I work on the next revision. Peter - -- Peter Saint-Andre https://stpeter.im/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.19 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJRuf7mAAoJEOoGpJErxa2paL8P/1y9L4T1kmKoW5V1BXkK/gfK 3nUX3pQnbDm++KTKjhjOBmaVuj1TKIK4G2IzHRHt63fPBS9pPFoIQ7DLC+35DN7g qZ1yVekBnxMDwQ1shrHriNJCeCLp7fJ/IWCTb076ItEJvRE2w/OYCwDiNlL6rYky MQv3iDzBl8WqeqnwGypt8yLmbHKaPnMdHjmyVUq0QlZytAcDsOjtRl5ERi3Q5b8N JF+LKjTBjbvrNJsRbFTG/AFiNAJ9BiqJBVdcMNIRI8Z8gC1fLDpzS73WKm8JiJ6x /lMfhGS+0xOGzvIzT0AVsls1OZWBN/WqGPJWScEn5ptRKU9mMiU2FcyKgKH0WDN+ ZAD6MvOeiFjVZEv2mX2WYQUbvoQTT6JSS/c2Ld0d1nz+s+vHV2b9UM43DdgeWaH6 dP3z4uCWdMrph8aLmiljSsjGYFC0CLvexoH1BRr0hX6uV3xadLm/SixhBxlB2k+B 31EsjUSJZOd8TX3C83lWPL2x5d36E/xd39GPNDkL1bjtOtgecWl4OqC5NkBdh+eL MkLDaQkQTkKJWuB4Vh6NNNB0czVbkaxafzX3FxeanwfsOQ62yYDN6RaRLu5osJaX cLDsdgxBOYnFcmMFRsM+PzVau8iwk54TelK8vzERY5lu5vAy3+n7blKGfTNUxf+D Cgz2kPtcq6Edia7MhxXx =ujCZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
