On 10 Oct 2015, at 22:58, Matthew Wild <[email protected]> wrote: > > After various discussions, including here at the summit, I'm seeing a > rough consensus that the <private/> element in Carbons or the > ~equivalent <no-copy/> hint in XEP-0334 cause more trouble than they > are worth. > > The only use-case I've been able to find is preventing OTR messages > from being received by clients that cannot decrypt them. It is > debateable whether receiving garbage is worse than not knowing that > someone is trying to contact you on another resource. > > As the elements are basically only a workaround for OTR, and OTR is a > hack, and OTR has its own methods to solve this issue, one could argue > that we shouldn't be using these elements. > > Does anyone have strong feelings about this?
I think this is right. /K
