Hi, Le mardi 2 juin 2026, 19:30:10 heure d’été d’Europe centrale techmetx11 via Standards a écrit : > As it's written in the specs, I think the challenge protocol can be > abused to leak a user's presence, because any device associated to the > target user *MUST* send a message to the entity who requested the > challenge, as soon as it receives it.
Indeed, that something to change, it should probably be answered only to people with presence access. > > This would violate RFC 6121's guarantees to not leak the user's network > availability to an entity who's not authorized to know about it. > > So, I'm wondering if we could instead have the identity verification be > a secondary optional method of verification, and have something like a > signature of the JID (signed by the XID) in the user's PEP node, that > the user themself HAVE to re-sign once every so often, like a month or > week to ensure it remains valid, so that old hosts cannot impersonate > users with stale signatures. That sounds like a good option. Best, Goffi
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