Onset of winter will provide harsh backdrop for Afghan operations By Rahul Bedi in New Delhi, with additional reporting by Scott Gourley and Peter Felstead
The onset of the bitter Afghan winter by early next month will blunt any significant military offensive by the country's US-supported Northern Alliance against the Taliban regime in Kabul. Weather conditions may also limit US military operations designed to apprehend Osama bin Laden or strike at key Taliban positions. Military experts say the winter in Afghanistan, which lasts until April, renders all major military campaigns across the country a 'logistical nightmare'. Snow blocks all the main passes, especially in northern Afghanistan, making all movement difficult if not impossible, while blizzards and sleet considerably reduce visibility. "Temperatures plunging to minus 40 degrees Celsius, a wind chill factor of formidable intensity, snow and blizzards negate the fighting capability of any army, however well equipped," said Major General Himmat Singh Gill, former Indian military attaché to Kabul. This, he added, would be particularly true of the Northern Alliance, which would have to move southwards through the 12,000ft-high Salang and Bamiyan passes into the Kabul valley during any advance on the capital. These passes would provide the Taliban with formidable defensive positions, making it hard militarily to dislodge or push them back. The Taliban army, meanwhile, is conditioned to fighting in extreme cold, having done so for years. Its battle-hardened cadres are familiar with the bleak countryside, off which they have lived with relative ease. "Handling equipment in the extreme cold by ground troops becomes problematic, and all fighting, particularly at night, is reduced to low, almost insignificant levels," according to Colonel Ram Chander, who also has served as India's defence attaché in Afghanistan. Operating helicopters and light combat aircraft in such harsh weather would also be perilous, as blizzards significantly reduce visibility. Ground snow conditions induced 'white outs', impairing pilots' ability to identify locations and targets. Even Soviet pilots, used to operating under such conditions in their own country, found it impossible to operate in the Afghani winter during their decade-long occupation of Afghanistan that ended in 1989. US special operations forces (SOF) personnel and aircraft crews will not, of course, have any experience of the very difficult conditions in Afghanistan. However, although their peacetime training conditions are not as harsh as those they might face in combat, they will have trained in a wide range of inhospitable environments. In March 2001, for example, soldiers from the US Army's 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) 3rd Battalion, regionally oriented toward Europe, honed their cold weather/mountain skills with a deployment to Grand Mesa National Park. This field deployment allowed the SOF operators to train at elevations above 10,000ft. Operational conditions in the area reportedly included an average snow depth of more than 4ft and nightly low temperatures reaching minus 20 degrees Fahrenheit. Reflecting on the deployment, Lieutenant Colonel Walter Herd, Commander, 10th SFG(A), noted that "Our soldiers must be able to survive and operate in a harsh, cold weather environment." Indian troops, meanwhile, are among those soldiers who have fought in bleak conditions comparable to an Afghani winter. During their 11-week-long border war with Pakistan two summers ago in Kashmir's mountainous Kargil region, they faced grave hardship and suffered heavy casualties. Every combat soldier required the logistic support of five men to fight Pakistan's mountain-hardy fighters from the Northern Light Infantry, which occupied strategically superior positions and, being natives of the region, were well acclimatised. The one advantage US soldiers may have - apart from superior equipment - is the fact that they will not necessarily have to take and hold ground for prolonged periods but are more likely to be inserted for an operation and then extracted as soon as the mission is concluded. History has demonstrated that short-term punitive actions into Afghanistan, with specific objectives and a sound exit strategy, have been successful. Large-scale campaigns of invasion and occupation, on the other hand, such as the ill-fated Soviet intervention of 1979-89, have met a more ignominious fate. * The MH-60 series Black Hawk helicopter would typically be the kind of platform used to insert US special operations personnel during a small-scale mission into Afghanistan. (Click here <http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/misc/mh60heli _nse.shtml> for a non-subscriber overview of the Sikorsky S-70 Black Hawk special operations variants). USASOC representatives note that army SOF operators use three versions of the MH-60 to conduct overt or covert infiltration, exfiltration and resupply operations across wide-ranging environmental conditions: the MH-60K, MH-60L and MH-60L Direct Action Penetrator (DAP) (see JDW, 1 August 2001). These aircraft have a normal cruise speed of 120kt, a maximum dash speed of 178kt and normal mission range (with no aerial refuelling) of 450 nautical miles. Their normal mission endurance is 4 hours and 20 minutes. In terms of deployability, the MH-60s can be deployed by C-17, C-5A/B and C-141 aircraft. Sources state that a maximum of six MH-60s can be loaded on a C-5A/B, with one hour needed to prepare the helicopters for on-load and another hour for rebuild after they reach their destination. Four MH-60s can also be carried on each C-17 with the same hour required at each end. Finally, a C-141 can carry two MH-60s, although the aircraft reportedly require a 'considerable time' for preparation and rebuild. In each case, ammunition is palletised and loaded on the same aircraft for distribution at the destination. A rough idea of aviation weather considerations for infiltration/exfiltration training operations can also be found in recently released extracts from an SOF reference manual. In that material, SOF planners are provided with an overview of onboard MH-60 subsystems, from communications and navigation to defensive armament, along with weather planning considerations. Peacetime training considerations call for a weather minimum of 500ft ceilings and two miles visibility for training and planning, although a caveat implies that this envelope could vary due to operational mission considerations. Additional environmental restrictions call for "No severe turbulence, no heavy icing, and 45kt winds maximum allowable for engine start and shutdown." A minimum landing zone size is identified as 100 x 100ft. * http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/misc/janes0109 26_1_n.shtml NSP Lista isprobava demokratiju u praksi ==^================================================================ EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?bUrBE8.bVKZIq Or send an email To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] This email was sent to: archive@jab.org T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================
