|
Palestine-Israeli conflict in European and
American diplomacy
Europeans and Americans have
distinctive viewpoints regarding the nature and substance of the
Arab-Israeli peace process. Substantively, they differ on the two
fundamental questions involved in the peace process, the question of
Jerusalem and the plight of the Palestinian refugees. The terrorist
attack on the United States is not likely to bring about dramatic
changes in the two allies’ stance. Many Europeans feel that the
European Union would accept a Palestinian state if it were
unilaterally declared and would likely recognize it even though the
United States would not. Unlike the United States, which is seen as
having played a major role in perpetuating the current imbalances
between Israel and its Arab neighbors, particularly the
Palestinians, Europe believes that a durable, viable peace has to
adhere to legitimate international resolutions. Specialists agree
that Europe is well positioned to influence the course of events
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. On the one hand, the
Arab-Israeli conflict has no direct bearing on domestic EU politics.
On the other, the EU has important economic and political clout with
both Israel and the Arabs. The irony is, why does Europe accept its
exclusion? To begin with, the United States has exercised a veto on
active European participation in Middle Eastern diplomacy.
Next,
Europeans, as was mentioned earlier, are divided over the best
appropriate choices to pursue in the Arab-Israeli zone.
Finally,
Arabs themselves have a contradictory vision of the European
presence in Middle East power politics; although they claim to
welcome a more engaged role by Europe, their actions are different
from their words. Time and again, Arabs have joined ranks with the
United States and Israel to keep Europe out of the real picture of
peace negotiations, either by accepting US bullying or by playing
realpolitik for their own advantage. More than once, US officials
have informed their European counterparts that their official
presence and initiatives in the peace process are not welcome by
Arab rulers. Given the concerted opposition by the Americans,
Israelis, and Arabs, European policymakers see no choice but to
remain passive and marginalized in the peace process. The US war on
terrorism will further weaken Europe’s involvement in Arab-Israeli
peacemaking unless, of course, the Bush administration finds itself
besieged in the region’s quagmires. Have no doubt about it: despite
their public comments to the contrary, neither the French nor the
Germans desire to replace the United States as the principal players
in Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking. European leaders would like the
United States to shoulder its historic responsibilities and prevent
any further military escalation, which might have global
implications. However, Europe’s ambivalence has not prevented the EU
from taking some initiatives at critical junctures to salvage the
stalemated Arab-Israeli peace talks. The EU has played a role that
goes beyond that of the paymaster when its financial clout is
informed by political goals and objectives. The Berlin Declaration
is important in this regard; so is the Barcelona process. Some
European officials argue further that the EU and the US have
established a complicated relationship to exchange views and ideas
on the Arab-Israeli peace process. These informal contacts are
useful to both sides. The latter collaborate and join ranks to
present a solid front on the Arab-Israeli front. More often than not
it is the EU which acts as a junior partner and is at the receiving
end of this complex relationship. Therefore, it is misleading to
think or suggest that the EU wishes to replace the United States as
the main arbiter in peace negotiations; this is a “myth” shared by
some policy circles in the United States and Israel. Although the EU
now is much more involved in the Arab-Israeli peace process,
Europeans are fully aware of the “limits” of their role. This
awareness explains the fine line that the EU treads when it comes to
Arab-Israeli peace-making. As one European official declared: “We
cannot confront the United States, and we do not want to undermine
the peace process.” Hence, Europe’s role has to fit into a
particular “framework” that does not bypass the limits which the
United States has drawn. There is an urgent need to nudge the United
States to recognize the exiting shortcomings and gaps in the
deadlocked peace negotiations. After all, European observers note
that the United States has played a negative role on the Syrian and
Palestinian tracks by blindly supporting Israel and by perpetuating
the existing imbalance between Arabs and Israelis. Moreover, the
difficulty confronting Europe’s ability and willingness to become
more engaged in the Middle East lies in the absence of an
intellectual framework, which articulates and broadly defines its
priorities, interests, and concerns. Europe’s inaction may be thus
explained by the lack of its political will as well as by a
clearly-defined framework despite the obvious resources that Europe
would bring to a peace process. Conceptually, the contrasting EU-US
views cannot be understood except by examining their peculiar
domestic contexts as well as their global role. In the case of the
United States, the Congress and the organized special interests
impose major constraints on the executive branch, particularly on
the presidency. In contrast, Europe suffers little from this
phenomenon. Furthermore, Washington’s global responsibilities
predispose it to concentrate on strategic liabilities at the expense
of socio-economic and political development. Again, the EU does not
possess the global ambitions that the United States does and its
hands are not fettered by imperial considerations. Thus although the
two entities have differing priorities, objectives and structural
diversities, more often than not, the EU accommodates its Western
brother at the very cost to its various members’ interests. Europe’s
response to Bush’s call to arms against terrorism fits perfectly
this historical pattern. Nevertheless, the next few years will no
doubt bring a shift in US-European roles in the Middle East, but the
exact degree will depend to a large part on the degree of success of
the Bush administration in defining his foreign policy
priorities. The more distance the United States keeps from the
world, including the Middle East, the more responsibilities its
European partners would have to endure. It is a complex relationship
in which the United States acts (or fails to act) and the EU, its
junior partner, reacts. It remains to be seen if the terrorist
attack on the United States will predispose the Bush administration
to shift its foreign policy priorities and rely much more on its
European allies than it has done so far.
Fawaz A.
Gerges holds the Christian A. Johnson Chair in international affairs
and Middle East studies at Sarah Lawrence College, New York. He
wrote this commentary for The Daily Star
|
