STOP NATO: �NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK --------------------------- ListBot Sponsor -------------------------- Start Your Own FREE Email List at http://www.listbot.com/links/joinlb ---------------------------------------------------------------------- By mid-1994, arms, equipment and more were reaching Bosnia by other channels as well. DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS STRATEGIC POLICY reported from London at the end of last October that 400 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards had arrived in Bosnia with large supplies of arms and ammunition in May. [35] According to the magazine, the Central Intelligence Agency had full knowledge of this operation. According to STRATEGIC POLICY, U.S. agencies were also providing large quantities of weapons which had originated in China and in North Korea to Muslim forces in Bosnia. [36] Furthermore, artillery, rocket launchers and ammunition were arriving from Iran "with the knowledge and agreement of the U.S. government". Iranian military instructors, furthermore, were training Bosnian regulars and special operations units in Zenica in eastern Bosnia. More than 3,000 mujaheddin were fighting with the Bosnian 3rd Corps in Zenica. Numbers of Afghan mujaheddin had arrived in the autumn, STRATEGIC POLICY stated, at Ploce on the Croatian coast. They then went with false papers to Split and Livno and deployed in Bosnia, with different contingents going to the Kupres, Zenica and Banja Luka areas. [37] Most importantly, the magazine stated that the Afghan mujaheddin, who had been used in large numbers by the Central Intelligence in the Afghan war, were accompanied by U.S. Special Forces. These U.S. troops were on a covert mission to establish a command, control, communications and intelligence network (C3I) in Bosnia to co-ordinate and support Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Muslim and mujaheddin offensives in central, eastern and northern Bosnia. The Special Forces units brought their own high-tech communications equipment. [38] All of this was very reminiscent of the war in Indochina. There allied client states, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and others, were providing military assistance to the Saigon regime. The same pattern seems to be emerging in Bosnia, where other U.S. clients -- Turkey, Saudi Arabia, etc. -- are providing funds and military aid to the Sarajevo regime. Less than two weeks after the appearance of the report in STRATEGIC POLICY, the mainstream British press began to provide further information on the covert U.S. role in Bosnia. THE INDEPENDENT's correspondent, Robert Block, wrote in mid-November that the United States was directly aiding Bosnian forces, providing them with intelligence assistance and training. [39] In Bihac, he stated, where a new Muslim offensive was under way, Muslim military commanders had been provided with aerial photographs of Bosnian Serb troop dispositions. He reported further, citing French and U.S. military sources and a British diplomat, that retired American soldiers were helping to train Bosnian Muslim troops. One week later, the London GUARDIAN reported from Vienna that U.S. policies in Bosnia were dividing the NATO powers. According the the GUARDIAN correspondent, Washington was about to conclude military agreements with Zagreb and Sarajevo in order to strengthen the Izetbegovic regime. And such agreements were signed a short time later. [40] The correspondent described the U.S. ambassador in Croatia as saying that the U.S. would help to make the Muslims and Croats an "effective force" in dealing with "the aggression sponsored by Belgrade". [41] The GUARDIAN further stated that U.S. officials admitted that only Croatian and Bosnian officers were training at U.S. military colleges. Most importantly, the paper stated that both West European and U.N. officials claimed, "The U.S. military and the C.I.A. have embarked on [a program of] covert military aid and training for the Bosnian army". [42] At almost the same time, THE EUROPEAN reported from London that "America 'has joined the war' in Bosnia", and that the U.S. was deeply involved in the Muslim war effort. [43] The report stated that a high-level meetings had been held in Gornji Vakuf between U.S. military commanders and the Bosnian army's most important field commander, Filip Alagic. Two U.S. ambassadors were present, along with Gen. Charles Boyd, head of intelligence in the U.S. European Command and Brig. Gen. Mike Mirza, director of operations in the European Command. The purpose of the meeting had been: "to make recommendations about how to provide military support to the Bosnian presidency. The result was a U.S. decision to launch a covert plan to help the Bosnian Muslims". [44] According to the London paper, "small teams of non-uniformed personnel working for the C.I.A." were in position and directly assisting the Bosnian Muslim forces with training in tactical operations, satellite intelligence and air traffic control. According to THE EUROPEAN, a European defense source had stated that {the Americans] "are teaching the Bosnian Muslims how to fight the Bosnian Serbs". "The Americans are taking sides", the source was reported to have said. "They have, in fact, joined the war." [45] THE EUROPEAN also reported a West European UNPROFOR official as saying that "we have seen Americans in uniform and out of uniform for months. They stay at some of the Bosnian army bases and keep themselves to themselves." According to the paper's correspondent, senior UNPROFOR officers said they knew U.S. military personnel and CIA personnel had been working as advisers to help train Bosnian soldiers and to plan Bosnian army operations. [46] There were also indications that Bosnians were being trained in other countries. [47] THE EUROPEAN also stated that roads were being converted to landing strips in various parts of Bosnia. It quoted one Western source as saying that, "The Americans are masterminding the construction of a secret airfield in an isolated valley between Visoko and Kakanj in central Bosnia, about 25 kilometers from the nearest Bosnian Serb positions." [48] Finally, the paper's correspondent expressed his own view that "the assistance of U.S. teams has been vital in recent Bosnian army successes." It should be noted that none of these reports -- and many were published in the European press at the time -- was published in the press in the United States. And this was despite the fact that they were based almost exclusively on Western sources, including officials of the United Nations and of UNPROFOR. The first that was heard of these reports in the mainstream U.S. press was in THE WASHINGTON POST of November 19 last year. Citing official sources in Washington and unnamed "Western diplomats", the paper ran a story under the headline, "CHARGES U.S. AIDS MUSLIMS APPEAR TO BE INACCURATE. [49] However, the story itself was exceedingly ambiguous. It contained such statements as, "However, despite their alleged inaccuracies, the reports do highlight the important role played by the U.S. military in Bosnia and in the region -- a role not limited to providing food or supporting U.N. activities." [50] The report contained further details of U.S. military involvement in Bosnia and Croatia. But the headline was perhaps the most important part of the story, as is so often the case in the realm of propaganda. And reports on the questions which had been raised in the foreign press stopped almost immediately. They were to resume, however, early in the new year. In late January, THE NEW YORK TIMES published information making it clear that some of the earlier reports about efforts to turn the Muslim army into "an effective force" had been correct. The paper reported that the United States would soon send General Frederick Franks Jr., the former commander of the VII Corps in the Persian Gulf war, to Bosnia "to assist the Muslim-Croat federation here with the integration of its armed forces. [51] The paper also revealed that General John Galvin had spent some time previously in Bosnia trying to carry out the same task. He had, however, "been unable to overcome the deep mutual suspicions between Muslims and Croats" On February 22, The FINANCIAL TIMES reported that U.N. officials and diplomats in Bosnia believed the U.S to be flagrantly violating the arms embargo against that country. They stated that, on the night of February 10, U.N. observers in northeast Bosnia had seen a C-l30 Hercules transport accompanied by a jet fighter drop supplies by parachute at Tuzla, the second largest Bosnian-Muslim enclave and the site of a very large military base. At the time, U.S. jets were monitoring Bosnian airspace in a NATO operation called "Deny Flight", which has been under way since 1992. [52] And NATO apparently did not report any violations of Bosnian airspace that night. This report was flatly denied in Washington. NATO sources said the story was misleading. On February 25, however, THE GUARDIAN in London repeated the story, adding considerable further detail. THE GUARDIAN reported from Zagreb that UN analysts believed NATO was conniving at secret flights which were being used to arm the Bosnian Muslims covertly. THE GUARDIAN's reporter said that, despite the NATO denials, U.N. officials were standing by their reports. These were based on eye-witness accounts by a Norwegian helicopter pilot and a British intelligence officer. The Norwegian pilot had described a plane resembling a C-130 as having made a drop or a brief landing at the Tuzla airbase on February 10. Nordic United Nations troops, sent to investigate his report, were fired on by Bosnian government soldiers and could not pursue the matter further. The British officer reported similar airdrops or landings at Tuzla on February 12 and 17. United Nations analysts said they believed these flights were part of an effort to aupply arms covertly to the Bosnian government. According to THE GUARDIAN, they described the NATO reports denying such operations were under way as "absurd" and a "whitewash". It quoted one U.N. source as saying, "It's a covert operation. There's no doubt about it." [53] On February 26, THE INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY carried the story one step further. No one had yet speculated on exactly who might be carrying out the covert flights which were being reported. THE INDEPENDENT, however, reported that United Nations commanders in Bosnia suspected the United States was behind the secret night flights. The U.S. was "secretly supplying weapons to Bosnia". [54] U.N. peacekeepers believed that "transport-type aircraft of C-130 or like size" had dropped or delivered high-tech weaponry at the Tuzla airbase on five different occasions beginning on February 10. Senior U.N. officials thought that the airdrops might have been organized by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, possibly using planes from Turkey, which is well within range of Tuzla. THE INDEPENDENT said that "There was frantic activity in the State Department and National Security departments dealing with Bosnia last week". Moreover, the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Richard Holbrooks, had visited Turkey earlier in the week. On February 28, NATO itself issued a report denying that covert air operations were being used to deliver arms to Tuzla. The report, however, was drawn up by an American officer at NATO's Southern Command in Naples. The NATO report stated that the flights around Tuzla were either normal NATO air traffic in Bosnia or commercial aircraft in Serbian airspace. [55] According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, the U.S. officer in charge of Southern Command, Admiral Leighton Smith "was furious about the United Nations Reports". However, United Nations officials in Bosnia stuck to their guns. One U.N. official said the NATO claim that U.N. officers had made elementary errors in their original reports were "frankly ludicrous and insulting". Only a short time ago, the discussion of U.S. involvement in the war came full circle. On March 5, THE SUNDAY TIMES of London reported that "Turkey is suspected of secretly airlifting arms to Bosnian Muslims in preparation for a new round of fighting in the spring." [56] According to the paper, American intelligence officials were "convinced" that Turkey was engaged in an airlift, but they told journalists that they had no hard evidence of Turkey's assistance to Bosnia. "The flights", according to THE SUNDAY TIMES, "were first thought to be part of a covert operation by the Central Intelligence Agency to re-arm the Muslims." But the paper said that the C.I.A. and other Western intelligence agencies believed the flights originated in Turkey and were financed by Saudi Arabia. The paper did not note that this was a classic pattern in C.I.A. operations in the region. Nor did it find it strange that Central Intelligence sources would point the finger of accusation away from the C.I.A. and toward someone else, about whose role they were also "unsure". These are just a few of the reports which have surfaced in recent months about clandestine military assistance to the Bosnian government in violation of the United Nations arms embargo. U.S. and NATO officials have issued denials stating that these reports are untrue or seriously inaccurate. At the same time, it would seem that there is overwhelming eivdence that the US. has made a major, clandestine commitment to assist the Izetbegovic regime militarily. It appears to be providing arms, training and advisers to the Sarajevo army. And U.S. forces appear to be operating in the field as well, just as they did in Indochina long before the public knew about it. There are several reasons for coming to such conclusions. There are many, many eyewitness accounts indicating such an involvement on the part of the U.S. The sources providing this information to journalists are, for the most part, officials, diplomats and officers from Western countries opposing U.S. policy. And, finally, the same facts are reported again and again from a wide variety of sources. If these accounts are correct -- and they should be fully investigated, not suppressed -- then the United States is very deeply involved in the war in Bosnia. And this would be dangerous for exactly the same reasons that it was dangerous in Indochina. Conclusions As we have seen, the United States and Germany played a major role in the creation of an artificial state in the Balkans. This state, Bosnia, is a weak, minority-led regime It commands the loyalty of a little more than 40 per cent of its own population. And it controls some 20 per cent of the land area which it claims. By normal criteria, it would have never been recognized as an independent sovereign state. Nonetheless, the United States is now trying to make a viable state out of Bosnia. And the evidence strongly suggests that the U.S. has provided the Izetbegovic regime with the same kinds of resources which it provided to "South Vietnam" in the 1960s and the 1970s. This commitment has apparently led already to the dispatch of U.S. military and C.I.A. personnel to assist the besieged minority regime. The U.S. commitment in Bosnia is significant in two senses. Firstly, it is part of a broad strategy aimed at redrawing the map of the entire Balkan region. Like the strategy of containing communism in Asia, it will not be lightly abandoned. This will be true even if, as the McNamara case shows, U.S. officials realize that they have made a mistake. Secondly, the commitment is significant because it has already involved the expenditure of substantial money and resources. According to some sources, the U.S. has already spent more than $1 billion on the war in Bosnia. And it may be planning to spend as much as $5 billion in the near future. [57] As a European defense source put it last autumn, "They [the Americans] have, in fact, joined in the war." [58] The critical question today, for the peoples of the Balkans, for the Western powers, for the Islamic states involved and for Russia, is where this U.S. policy is leading. There are two issues that must be considered in answering this question. The first, assuming that the war in Bosnia is likely to continue for some time, is whether the U.S. itself is likely to become more involved in the war. The answer here is that it probably will. The Izetbegovic government and the cosmetic Muslim-Croat "federation" are far from stable. Sarajevo is certainly far from being able to give a consistently good account of itself militarily, as the events of November, 1994 in the Bihac pocket demonstrated. What will happen, then, if the Muslim army should again fail to push back the Serbs in Bosnia. There is every indication that the Muslim army and regular Croatian forces in Bosnia are about to launch a series of well-prepared offensives. The Sarajevo regime has already put considerable pressure on the Bosnain Serb army in the spring of this year, capturing the important communications tower at Stolice in north central Bosnia. These offensives may initially succeed. The Serbs, however,depite their manpower problems, have considerable reserves of tanks and heavy arms. And they will not hesitate to use these if necessary. The Muslim army, then, is likely, even in present circumstances, to suffer further reverses if it presses the Bosnian Serbs too hard. What will be the reaction of the American officials who are, in fact, running the war? It is very likely that they will react by increasing their efforts to "Vietnamize" the war in Bosnia, that they will spend more money, send more advisers, send more arms and provide more direct logistical support to the Muslim and Croat forces. The public in the United States does not realize what is happening in Bosnia. It does not know that American advisers and C.I.A. personnel are actually involved in the war there. And some might even approve of our policy if they did know about it. This makes it possible for our present leadership to continue increasing the U.S. commitment in Bosnia. It is "deniable". And it is politically costless. In any case, not to increase our aid to Sarajevo in the face of Muslim reversals would risk the regime which the U.S. is committed to supporting. And it would require our government to abandon an important element of its overall Balkan policy. This was the answer in Vietnam for nearly fifteen years. U.S. officials from the late l950s until the early 1970s took the view that the U.S. had to continue helping Saigon. If it did not, Saigon would fall. And then the "dominoes" would fall, and in the end "China would take over". Such were the incantations which drove us on. Thus the answer to every reversal was more U.S. assistance. After 1965, the answer was always more U.S. troops. U.S. officials were not prepared to believe that Saigon was losing the war, because they were not prepared to abandon their Vietnamese clients. Robert McNamara says in his book that the U.S. government should have abandoned "South Vietnam" in 1963. [59] In fact, rather than looking the facts in the face, U.S. officials tried to deceive the Congress, the American public and the world about what was happening in Vietnam. And they ended by deceiving themselves as well. So it is quite likely that, if a see-saw war in Bosnia continues for some time, the U.S. will be drawn more deeply into a new quagmire. The second issue which needs consideration is whether our policy in Bosnia makes any sense. Given that the U.S. is likely to remain committed to Sarajevo, where will our present policy take us in the long run? The answer here may be found by exploring the logic of the situation. There is a war going on in Bosnia. For both the Serbs and the Muslims, the stakes are very high. In the final analysis, there are only two logically possible outcomes in the Bosnian war. Either the Bosnian Serbs will win, and be able to maintain their independence on what the U.S., Germany and Sarajevo now consider "Bosnian soil", or the Izetbegovic regime will win, and be able to impose itself on the Bosnian Serbs. What would happen if it became clear that the Bosnian Serbs were about to win the war? It is certainly possible that at some point, especially if they feel really threatened, the Bosnian Serbs will launch a devastating major offensive against the Muslim army. The Bosnian Muslims could easily sustain a major defeat. They might be forced to retreat from critical areas they now hold. That could lead in turn to the collapse of the Sarajevo regime. Would the U.S. and NATO merely stand by? Could they resist the enormous pressures to intervene militarily at such a time? It seems very doubtful. U.S. or NATO intervention would produce a major confrontation in Bosnia, and possibly Croatia. This might well bring in the Yugoslav army if Western intervention were seen to pose a threat to the two Serb republics in Bosnia and Croatia. If such a confrontation ever takes place, no one will be able to predict the consequences. The Bosnian Serbs might feel forced to carry the war into Croatia proper. NATO might very well attack military positions and installations inside Yugoslavia. The Bosnian Serbs or the Yugoslavs, depending on the Western response to Yugoslav invovement, might attack NATO bases in Italy, or even in Germany. Turkey might enter the war in Bosnia, precipitating a general Balkan war. Russia might intervene directly or idirectly. In short, without any doubt at all, the war would spread and increase in intensity. This would inevitably affect the whole of Europe, dividing it profoundly in the midst of spreading chaos. The consequences of a major conflict in central Yugoslavia between NATO forces and the Serbs would be catastrophic for all. Should the United States be pursuing a strategy which poses such high risks? The other obvious possibility is that the Izetbegovic regime might win the war. What would happen if the Izetbegovic regime scored a major military victory? Let us make a series of assumptions which U.S. policy-makers must be making. Let us assume that the Muslim army in Bosnia could, in fact, defeat its Serb adversaries. Let us also assume that Yugoslavia would not intervene to prevent such a development. Neither of these assumptions is very realistic. But if U.S. policy-makers are not making them, then their policy in Yugoslavia is completely pointless. Why would the U.S. support a government which it believes to have no chance of winning the war in which it is engaged? It would be a formula for nothing less than permanent war. Our policy-makers, therefore, must at least imagine that the Izetbegovic regime can win. The initial result of a Muslim victory would be obvious. Isolated and militarily defeated, the Serbs would have to abandon their republics, in Bosnia and in Croatia. They would then have the choice of staying in both countries under horrific conditions or leaving for Yugoslavia. But, despite being under siege -- a siege which is less and less popular with the countries of Eastern Europe -- Yugoslavia would be more or less intact. It would receive covert assistance from Russia, Greece, Rumania and Bulgaria. With half the Bosnian Serbs in Yugoslavia and half in Bosnia, what would be likely to happen, indeed not just likely but absolutely certain to happen? Firstly, the Bosnian government would continue with its ethnic cleansing of Serbs. Secondly, this would lead to repression and guerrilla war. Thirdly Serb guerrillas would begin to operate not just in Bosnia and probably parts of the Krajina, but also from Yugoslavia. Finally, the Serb guerrillas would also receive assistance from Russia, Greece, Rumania and Bulgaria. In short, a Muslim victory in Bosnia would not lead to the establishment of anything like a normal state, but to prolonged instability and conflict. When John F. Kennedy considered sending U.S. military advisers to Vietnam, he posed two conditions which would have to be met. The Saigon regime would have to achieve political stability. And it would have to be able to defend itself. [60] These conditions were never really met. United States officials ignored them. In the face of every reversal, U.S. civilian and military officials persuaded themselves that the situation could be "turned around" in the future. All that was necessary was more aid, and, later on, more troops. But the United States was never able to establish a viable regime in Vietnam, despite the expenditure of tens of billions of dollars and the dispatch of nearly half a million troops. For the entire enterprise was based on grandiose ambitions, ignorance, distorted information, self-serving analysis and misguided personal and bureaucratic ambitions. And the tragedy of Vietnam may be attributed in part to the fact that the conditions posed by Kennedy were ignored. The United States is now making the same mistake in Bosnia. For there can never be a stable government in Bosnia under a Muslim-led regime. A Muslim military victory over the Serbs would not produce a stable government but a repressive one. The political conflict in Bosnia would not be resolved but suppressed. And, in consequence there would be no peace. There would almost certainly be a long guerrilla war, a war which could easily spread to other parts of the Balkans. The Sarajevo regime, therefore, would continue to be dependent on the U.S., Germany and the Islamic states for continued security assistance. For that reason alone, Bosnia would remain an artificial state. It could achieve a minimum of stability only with foreign assistance. The Bosnian "state" would remain an artificial one in another sense. The Serbs work most of the farmland in Bosnia. After a Muslim "victory", those lands would either be depopulated or in turmoil. Where would Bosnia be if its farmlands were in chaos? Economic development could scarcely be expected to resume. Bosnia would be largely dependent on the outside world for many of its everyday needs. The United Nations, major donor countries and international aid organizations would be called on to supply those needs. Would they want to do so under the political conditions which would in all probability prevail? It does not seem likely. Therefore, even if the Sarajevo could achieve a military victory over the Bosnian Serbs, the results would bring little improvement over the conditions which prevail at present. For the fundamental issues would not have been resolved equitably. And they cannot be, as long as the United States and Germany continue to support a regime whose main reason for existence is that it serves their strategic interests in a land which belongs to other peoples Thus U.S. policy in Bosnia either leads to a wider war, in which the U.S. would inevitably be involved, or it leads to the establishment of another politically unstable client state. This is not a policy, but a guarantee of costly failure, just as our policy in Indochina was. It is therefore time to recognize that our policy in Bosnia is mistaken. Recently a former Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, told reporters at the United Nations that the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been a mistake. [61] Mr. Vance was right. What is needed now is a serious national debate about U.S. policy in Bosnia and the parallels to our policy in Vietnam. This should include a scrutiny of our policy in the Balkans as well. It is only if such a debate is begun, that we shall have a chance of avoiding the same trap which killed 59,000 Americans and more than two million Vietnamese in the 1960s and the 1970s. ______________________________________________________________________ To unsubscribe, write to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
