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Yugoslavia: Right Back Where We Started
1530 GMT, 010625
By George Friedman
Summary
Just two years after NATO won its conflict against Yugoslavia, the new
government in Belgrade is preparing to extradite former President Slobodan
Milosevic. But a new, old logic now flows from the Balkans. The charges
against Milosevic, regarding Kosovo, do not appear to amount to the rhetoric
leveled at him during the war. And the need to reward the Kostunica
government for its help is strong. Expect NATO to reward Belgrade -- quite
possibly with Kosovo.
Analysis
Two events in the Balkans last week drew attention back to the troubled
region. The first was the apparent decision by the Kostunica government to
extradite former president Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes charges. The
second was an attempt by Europe to broker a cease-fire in Macedonia. Both, in
different ways, are cautionary tales against thinking that closure in the
Balkans is possible.
Kostunica had better have something to show for it. It will not be much in
the ways of economic aid. Therefore, expect the prosecutors to take exquisite
care in vilifying Milosevic and some close associates, but not Serbia or
Yugoslavia as a whole. Also expect the West to see Serbian national
aspirations being treated much more solicitously than in the past,
particularly in Kosovo.
The decision to turn Milosevic over for trial cuts to the heart of the 1999
war in Kosovo and Western attempts to settle it. According to the NATO
alliance, the primary motivation for the war in Kosovo was an attempt to
protect the minority Albanian community from persecution by the Serbian
government. Two years ago, the rhetoric from Western capitals, particularly
Washington and London, became intense: Claims of Albanian dead and missing
ranged from the tens of thousands to, on particularly emotional days, the
hundreds of thousands.
What actually happened in Kosovo matters not only in an historical sense, but
also in a legal and moral sense. Legally, genocide is a crime against
humanity. Crimes against humanity are understood to be extraordinary actions
that offend the fundamental moral principles of decent human society. The
outside world must treat the perpetrators as outlaws and find the regime in
which they served illegitimate in the eyes of the world community.
But the war crimes that have been discovered in Kosovo -- of which Milosevic
stands accused -- are different. A war crime does not have the enormity of a
crime against humanity and can be an isolated event in a generally legal war.
For example, during World War II, allied soldiers on occasion shot prisoners
from the German Waffen SS. The individual SS soldier had been engaged in
crimes against humanity; the American soldier who shot him was not. The
American GI, however, was guilty of a war crime: shooting a prisoner.
Between these is a moral and political gulf that is vast both in scale and
intention. Milosevic has not been charged with genocide in Kosovo, though a
sealed indictment suggests genocide in Bosnia. But in Kosovo, Milosevic has
been charged with war crimes. The rhetoric in Western capitals prior to the
war in Kosovo clearly implied that NATO intervention was necessary because
crimes against humanity were underway.
Embedded in this distinction is the entire justification for intervention.
NATO intervened to end at least temporarily Serbian control over Kosovo, de
facto ending its sovereignty in the province. Such an action is an extreme
one, both under the United Nations charter and international law. If such an
action can be taken for war crimes, then the sovereignty of many states over
territories might be in question -- since a single act against a single
individual would constitute a war crime.
This is why the concept of a crime against humanity is such an important
distinction. A crime against humanity requires an action of such enormity
that other values - such as the integrity of the nation-state - are
superceded. The international tribunal in The Hague has stepped back from the
rhetoric that justified the war in the first place to a charge that can
probably successfully be prosecuted. This makes sense both given the evidence
at hand and for political reasons.
By confining the charge against the former Serbian leader to war crimes, the
tribunal achieves two things. First, it draws a distinction between Milosevic
and the Yugoslav regime. Milosevic may have had collaborators, but it is
possible to prosecute war crimes charges individually without making the
entire regime complicit. This is not the case with crimes against humanity.
Second, by confining the charges to war crimes, the tribunal makes a clear
statement about the future of Kosovo. The moral basis for ending Belgrade's
sovereignty over Kosovo is not compelling.
Instead, at a political level, the West is reshaping strategy by making a
deal with Milosevic's own supporters. They will not be prosecuted; only
Milosevic will stand trial. The only way to move out of gridlock has been to
accept the regime - at least its elite, replace the top leader with
Kostunica, and allow the appearance of fundamental change to emerge. In the
meantime, it was hoped that Kostunica, the new leader, over time could make
headway in implementing substantial changes acceptable to the West.
Even if Milosevic stands trial, though, the West faces a problem in
Yugoslavia. The regime itself is still fundamentally nationalistic. Kostunica
is more attractive than Milosevic in many ways, but he remains a committed
Serbian nationalist. Moreover, Kostunica would be completely invalidated
politically if he simply abandoned the defense of the territorial integrity
of Yugoslavia. Kostunica and his Western allies have focused public attention
away from nationalism and toward economic reconstruction.
But no substantial assistance has come to Yugoslavia. To be more precise, no
assistance has come that would make a qualitative difference in the life of
Yugoslavians. The core reason is that the West has not been particularly
interested in making substantial investments in Serbia, perhaps recognizing
the failure of massive aid investments to result in concrete results in other
places, such as Russia.
As a result, a serious crisis will emerge for the Kostunica government.
Kostunica and the Serbs will expect a substantial and meaningful inflow of
money to stabilize their financial system. That is probably not going to
happen. Although Western aid will no doubt flow, it will not be enough to
make a difference in the life of the average Serb.
The West will have to give Kostunica something. The logical outcome is the
return of Kosovo. Yugoslav units are already inside the zone that separated
them from occupying forces in Kosovo after the war. Elections are scheduled
for the fall; it is conceivable that these may not be held, particularly if
the vestiges of the Kosovo Liberation Army act up.
Increasingly, Belgrade is getting something: The West has really switched
sides, opposing the ethnic Albanian movements it backed just two years ago.
This is what the conflict in Macedonia is about; it gives NATO a genuine
opportunity to continue its policy reversal and blame violence on ethnic
Albanian militants. NATO now sees this movement as destabilizing and
unfriendly.
In short, in the Balkans - just two years after the NATO air war against
Yugoslavia - we are going right back to where we started from. Related
Analysis:
Yugoslav Legislation May Send Milosevic to The Hague
The government of Yugoslavia has approved draft legislation that, if passed
by Parliament, would allow Yugoslav citizens to be extradited for trial in
The Hague. The legislation is almost sure to become law, and people in
Yugoslavia expect a quid pro quo. While Belgrade will always have the option
of not actually enforcing the extradition law, odds are that former President
Slobodan Milosevic will soon stand before the war crimes tribunal.
Analysis
The Yugoslav government on June 14 approved draft legislation paving the way
for extradition of accused war criminals, such as former President Slobodan
Milosevic. The legislation authorizes the government to cooperate with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague.
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