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DON�T COUNT RUSSIA OUT
A Reply to Jeffrey Tayler
By W. George Krasnow

�Russia Is Finished,� proclaims Jeffrey Tayler in his article in the May
issue of The Atlantic Monthly. Not only is it finished, �as a Great
Power,� but cannot expect any better future than that of �Zaire with
permafrost�a sparsely populated yet gigantic land of natural resources
exploited by an authoritarian elite as the citizenry sinks into poverty,
disease, and despair.� It is doomed irrevocably by its own history,
religion, and the character of its people.

Dismissing Russia�s current economic rebound as entirely due to higher
oil prices,Tayler gives no credit for President Vladimir Putin. He
scorns Putin�s efforts to pull Russia out of the morass left in the wake
of West-sponsored reforms. He portrays Putin�s program of strengthening
the state as a return to the autocratic tradition of the czars. The
harder the Russians try to get out of their predicament, Tayler seems to
be saying, the more they fail.

Tayler�s article is more than a forecast: it is his final verdict
against the country, its religion, historical tradition, past, current
and future leaders, and the character of its people. Not only does
Tayler squarely lay the blame for Russia�s current difficulties on the
Russians themselves. He leaves them no wiggle room to improve, no chance
to regenerate or avoid their bitter fate. In short, it is a damnation of
a whole nation.

I think Tayler is essentially wrong both in his description of Russia�s
current state of affairs and in his wholesale condemnation of Russia�s
past. Although Russia undoubtedly is going through a very difficult
time, Tayler�s forecast of the future is just as unfounded. Russia is
down, but it is definitely not out, presently or in the foreseeable
future. U.S. strategists cannot make a worse mistake than to accept
Tayler�s suggestion that Russia should be relegated to �strategic
irrelevance.�

Not that Tayler�s article lacks some valid points. Several times he
comes close to telling the truth.� He reports that �because the West
supported the bombardment [of Yugoslavia] and sided so openly with
Yeltsin afterward, many saw the West as colluding with Yeltsin to weaken
Russia.� He acknowledges that �the violence [of the Yeltsin government
against the parliamentary opposition] received accolades from western
politicians whom most Russians until then viewed as honorable and above
the tumult of Russian politics.� He knows that the disastrous �shock
therapy� was �advocated by the West.� He admits that Anatoly Chubais�
privatizatation, was both �blessed by Western governments� and �rigged.�
He alludes that IMF, �International banks and Western economists� were
guilty of covering up the corruption of Russian bureaucrats.

Yet, while condemning the Russians, Tayler fails to issue even a mild
indictment of the U.S. role. He seems strangely unaware of Janine
Wedel�s book, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid
to Eastern Europe 1989-1998 (New York: St. Martin�s Press). According to
Wedel, the U.S. government helped wreak economic and social disaster in
Russia by providing inappropriate policy advice and aid to corrupt power
brokers. Last September the U.S. Department of Justice sued Harvard
University and two of its scholars, Andrei Shleifer and Jonahann Hay,
accusing them of ''[abusing] their positions as high-level and trusted
advisers to, and on behalf of, the United States in Russia.�

Harvard's $57 million Russia project, which ran from 1992 to 1997, was
United States� top foreign aid programs to westernize Russian financial
system. Justice Department also accuses the now defunct Harvard
Institute of International Development (for which Shleifer and Hay
worked) of having "defrauded the United States out of $40 million,� the
amount paid to HIID to work on Russian economic policy in tandem with
reformers like Chubais.

Among higher-level protectors of the Russian-American tandem (Chubais
and Yegor Gaidar on the Russian side; Shleifer, Hay, and Jeffrey Sachs
on the American) Wedel names Larry Summers, one time chief economist of
the World Bank, then Secretary of the Treasury, and now newly appointed
President of Harvard University.

Writing in the 24 June, 2001 issue of The Nation, Matt Bivens, former
editor of Moscow Times, asks the legitimate question in conjunction with
Summers� recent appointment: �Why did Summers, while he was a top
official at Treasury, so ardently embrace the corrupt sell-off of Soviet
industries?�

Just as important is the question Wedel raised about the legality of
giving the award to Harvard �without competitive bidding,� and for
�foreign policy considerations.� First, how could one instruct Russians
about the importance of competitive bidding in a free market economy, if
the choice of instructors was done without competitive bidding? Second,
assuming that those �foreign policy considerations� included Russia�s
weakening, was it not a folly to weaken Russia far beyond what was
thought to be �good� for the United States?

So much for the U.S. role in the reforms of which the key results were
indeed the weakening of the Russian state, emergence of the Russian
oligarchs, and the impoverishment of the Russian people. And this is
leaving aside the role of such American tutors of the �new Russian
capitalists� as Mark Rich.

Tayler�s damnation of Russian national heritage is not new. Many
American Sovietologists had so little understanding of, and sympathy
for, the pre-Soviet Russian heritage that they hoped they would never
have to deal with it. They thought that Communism and Soviet Empire
would last forever. Those Sovietologists could not even conceive of
Russia�s future in other than Marxist-Leninist terms. So wide-spread and
insidious was Marxist influence among America�s �the best and the
brightest,� that George Will, the conservative columnist, used to quip
that there were more Marxists at Harvard than at any Soviet university.

Even those Sovietologists who were not pro-Marxist, nonetheless felt
greater affinity with Marxist terminology since it was of Western origin
and dealt with familiar topics, such as class struggle, colonialism and
social inequality. It was not such a long time ago when it was more
popular, at least among the American academic establishment, to denounce
American imperialism, the �aggressive� NATO alliance, corporate
war-mongers and free-markets than the Soviet Union.

The most hopeful scenario for the future Sopvietologists then offered
was the division of  the world into two peacefully co-existing camps.
One, the West, consisted of countries with a strong democratic heritage.
The other, the East, comprised the Russians, all the Slaves, the Chinese
and other peoples whose authoritarian heritage allegedly doomed them to
live under Communism.

In April 1979 in the pages of The Russian Review I challenged certain
russophobic propensities in the writings of Richard Pipes, Professor of
Russian History at Harvard University (�Richard Pipes�s Foreign
Strategy: Anti-Soviet or Anti-Russian?�). Pipes propagated the theory
that Soviet expansionism was motivated not by Soviet leaders�
Marxist-Leninist ideology (�minor influence�), but by their Russian
national character. �Whatever the regime and its formal ideology,�
argued Pipes, Russian politicians cannot be trusted because they
inevitably will follow �the persistent tradition of Russian expansion.�
Since many Soviet leaders �directly descended from peasantry,� claimed
Pipes, their mentality was of �a very special kind,� including �slyness,
self-interest, reliance on force, skill in exploiting others,
and�contempt for those unable to fend for themselves.�  Next year
Professor Pipes was appointed National Security Adviser under President
Reagan.

Now Tayler continues to propagate the same theory. His article produced
a lively e-mail forum debate, introduced by The Atlantic Monthly�s
editor, Sage Stossel, who asked the question: �Is Russia a tragic
country doomed by its history and character?�  The most perceptive
readers saw through Tayler�s anti-Russian bias, dishonesty, and
superficiality and answered in the negative. However, Ms Stossel�s other
question----�Do you think that, given a few lucky breaks, Russia might
have won the Cold War and dominated the globe?�--did not elicit much
response. I don�t know why. But I suspect that the Americans are not
inclined to remember their history.

One of the lessons The Atlantic Monthly readers failed to recall was
that the war in Vietnam, the antiwar movement and racial riots nearly
brought America to the brink of collapse. As I became a naturalized U.S.
citizen in 1976, I remember very well that after the defeat in Vietnam
the prevailing mood of the country was profoundly pessimistic and
defeatist. The best the U.S. could hope for, it was believed, was to
contain Soviet expansion and to work out some sort of d�tente with
Soviet leaders lest they put in action the Brezhnev Doctrine in yet
another country.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the Russian novelist who, after being expelled
from the USSR, settled in Vermont, was in the forefront of a small group
of patriotic Americans who sustained the conviction that there were many
precious values and blessings of life in the West which were worth
fighting for.

Yet, when in his �Letter to Soviet Leaders� (1974), Solzhenitsyn
outlined a program of reforms to move the Soviet system away from
Marxism toward re-awakening of Russian national consciousness, this
letter was ignored not just by the Soviets. U.S. foreign policy
strategists, the academic community, and the media also largely ignored
it. And those who did not, denounced it as a product of an embittered
and archaic mind. Neither the Voice of America, nor Radio Liberty/Free
Europe deigned broadcast Solzhenitsyn�s Letter to the captive audience
of  Soviet block listeners. And when Solzhenitsyn prophesied that not
only his books, but also he himself would return to a free Russia, he
was not even taken seriously. He was ridiculed for being so out of touch
with the Realpolitik.

So great was there then a desire for making deals with Soviet leaders
that the media often failed to report certain incidences of opposition
to the Soviet regime for fear of disrupting the d�tente process. For
instance, when on November 8, 1975, the 58th anniversary of the
Bolshevik Revolution, a mutiny broke out on the Soviet destroyer
�Storozhevoy,� moored in Riga harbor, the news never found its way to
the media. The rebels seized control of the ship and took it to
international waters where Soviet jets chased the fugitive destroyer.
Strafing it from the air, they finally managed to stop it. I was told
that though NATO personnel intercepted communications between the Soviet
jets, they decided to sit on the news. (See my book under Vladislav
Krasnov, Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List, Hoover Inst., 1985)

Only after the American people elected Ronald Reagan to the presidency
in 1979---in spite of the media�s and intellectual establishment�s
overwhelming opposition, I should add-- only then did the United States
rebound from its post-Vietnam moral downturn. But even then the two-term
president was under constant attacks for his anti-Communist activities
in Hollywood, for allegedly being �a trigger-happy cowboy,� and for his
forecast that Communism would be consigned to the dustbin of history.

So, to answer Stossel�s question, the Soviet Union--not Russia--could
have indeed won the Cold War, not because of a superiority of their
socialist system, but because there were powerful forces in the United
States who were ever eager to pander to the Soviets.

Tayler was just one of many Sovietologists who �developed a passion� for
Russia in �its Soviet incarnation,� the country that �had nuclear
weapons and a powerful military, a threatening and subversive ideology,
a tendency to invade its neighbors or meddle in their affairs, and the
might to wreak havoc on other continents.� Tayler�s fascination with raw
power--without any regard to its moral implications--tells more about
him than the country of his passion. �Russians I came to know spoke of
the future of their country as if it would be the fate of humanity, and
I agreed with them,� he says.

Tayler�s passion for Soviet power was typical of many American
Sovietologists. No wonder there were only a few of them who anticipated
or expected the collapse of Communism in Russia or anywhere else.
Hundreds of volumes, now collecting dust, dealt with the problems of
�transition� from capitalism to communism, but there was none about
going the other way.

One exception was my own book, Russia Beyond Communism: A Chronicle of
National Rebirth (Westview Press, 1991) I started to write it
immediately after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Convinced that
Gorbachev�s reforms would inevitably push the country �beyond� what he
intended, I set out to monitor the emergence of a non-ideological
Russian national alternative to Soviet ideology.

While the majority of Western Sovietologists held the belief that ethnic
Russians enjoyed their �dominance� over national minorities, my research
showed that the Russians were just as fed up with Communism. I argued
that the rebirth of national awareness among Russians was no less
legitimate than among the minorities and should be welcome in the West
as it would eventually undo Soviet threat to the free world. I also
argued that Russian nationalism, certainly in its moderate mainstream
manifestation a la Solzhenitsyn, was a natural ally of the West because,
unlike atheistic Marxism, it harks back to the common Judeo-Christian
tradition. I predicted that the Soviet Union would fall because ethnic
Russians refused to hold it together and that �Goliath� Gorbachev will
be defeated by �David� Yeltsin because the latter �now champions
Russia�s national rebirth (337).�

In August 1991, after Boris Yeltsin suppressed the old guard putsch and
replaced the Communist red flag with the Russian national tricolor, I
gave him a copy of my new book as a gift. I never heard from him again.
I can only surmise that his growing power attracted to him the kind of
advisers and hangers-on for whom Russian national aspirations held
little value.

Like Gorbachev�s retinue before them, Yeltsin�s �reformers� were all
superficial �Westernizers.� They were �Westernizer� not because they
knew and appreciated the values of Western civilization but because they
did not. They were superficial because the ideological isolation and
insulation of the Soviet regime was such that it prevented them from a
deeper knowledge and understanding of the West. And at the same time,
they were the kind of people who did not know where they came from.
Theye were like an �Ivan who remembers not his kin� (as the Russian
saying goes).

The greatest obstacle to democratic and free-market reforms stemmed from
the totalitarian legacy of the 74-year Soviet rule. It meant, first of
all, that there were no opposition parties or groups who could take over
the reins of the reforms. Naturally, all the reformers came from the
ranks of the Communist party whose ideology had brought the country to
an economic dead-end, in the first place. The self-appointed healers, on
whom the West came to rely, were part of the problem. Even those among
them, who sincerely embraced the ideas of democracy, retained the
totalitarian mentality and habits of Soviet elite.

We often forget that Soviet censorship isolated Soviet people not only
from the knowledge of the West, but also from their pre-Soviet and
Soviet history. Glasnost� opened the eyes of the Russian people not only
toward the outside world but also to their history which had been
stamped out and distorted during the Soviet rule. But there was little
time to absorb the knowledge. Consequently, the �Westernizers� were as
blind about Russia�s past as they were ignorant about the West.

Marxist education conditioned them not to expect anything good from
Russia. After all, Marx himself was an Eurocentric russophobe.
Consequently, they did not look very hard for the lessons from Russian
reforms of the past. Moreover, since the books of Russian past proffered
neither money, nor ready-made advice, nor fully-paid trips abroad, the
�Westernizers� quickly shut them down in favor of all those things
streaming toward them from the West.

Thus they became the willing executioners of whatever schemes came from
the West, even those about which serious Western economists had grave
doubts. The intellectual atmosphere was ripe for imposing on Russia-- by
presidential decrees -- of such misguided, mismanaged and possibly
criminal schemes as that of the Sachs-Shleifer-Gaidar-Chubais clique.
Alas, all this time, Western media remained silent about undemocratic
and illegal behavior of the �Westernizers� that went against the grain
of everything that the so-called democratic West stands for or, at
least, supposed to stand for.

Tayler chooses to call such behavior on the part of Yeltsin �czarlike.�
Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, two scholars with a considerably
deeper knowledge of Russian history, more aptly called it �Bolshevik.�
Their book, The Tragedy of Russia�s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against
Democracy (U.S. Institute of Peace Press) puts to shame everything
Tayler says about U.S. sponsorship of poverty, crime, corruption, and
oligarchic tyranny in lieu of the promised democracy, prosperity, and
the rule of law.

As a result, the decade after the Russians so hopefully and freely (for
the first time during the atheist Soviet rule) celebrated the millennium
of their Christianity in 1988, was wasted on a foolish attempt to
replace one extreme Western economic scheme, Marxism, with another,
almost equally extreme, Monetarism. The cost of that folly in terms of
human suffering, humiliation, and the loss of life was staggering, far
exceeding what the Americans remember as the tragic years of the 1929
financial crash and following depression.

The 20th century turned out to be the most tragic in Russian history. It
survived two World Wars on its territory, the second one taking more
then twenty millions lives. It survived the Bolshevik Revolution, Red
Terror, and the Civil War, no less devastating than the civil war in
America. It survived the Gulags. It survived the Cold War during which
it developed its industrial and scientific base comparable to the best
in the world, but at an incomparably greater cost to its people. It
survived �Market Bolshevism� proffered in the guise of Western
benevolence. It is a miracle that Russia is still alive on the threshold
of the 3rd Millennium.

After the nearly fatal �Shock Therapy� and other Western medicine,
Russia is still feeble. That�s why even honest observers can interpret
her vital statistic as symptoms of approaching death. Presently, she may
still be listed as a patient in critical, but stable condition. But she
shows signs of recovery. Moreover, for the first time since 1991, the
polls show that the majority of the Russian people, put a cautious trust
in her doctor, President Putin, assigned to put her back on her feet.
Putin�s KGB background may not be the best credential for a healer. But
neither was Yevgeny Primakov�s. However, it was Primakov who first
started chasing away the oligarchic jakals and their Western advocates
from Russia�s ICU.

Besides, since the U.S. sponsors another KGB boss, Eduard Shevardnadze
of Georgia, and even plans to drag him to NATO, it is clear that it is
something else the media don�t like about Putin. That �something� is
apparently Putin�s efforts to strengthen Russian statehood and
territorial integrity that some elements of U.S.government so foolishly
sought to undermine. They largely succeeded in their task, but only at
the cost of undermining U.S.� own credibility and discrediting the
once-cherished notions of democracy, rule of law, free press, and free
markets we were supposed to promote among the Russians.

Putin may yet succeed in his task of making Russian economy worthy of a
great nation. But, unless he learns well the lessons of Russian history,
his chances of success are nil. It seems that he has learned the lesson
that the Russian State, not foreign advisers, should be in charge of
reforms. Neither Peter the Great, nor Alexander II, nor Peter Stolypin
relied exclusively on the benevolence and good sense of their foreign
advisers. Neither of the three took dictation from abroad. Neither of
the three undertook reforms from a position of weakness. Putin may yet
find out that the deeper he looks into Russian history (with its
Orthodoxy, Mongol yoke, serfdom, and other real and alleged warts), the
more inspiration he will find in the perseverance, patience, humbleness,
good sense, and courage of the Russian people.

Russia has much to learn from other countries, especially, Western
Europe and the United States. However, all that learning will do no good
until Russia stands on her own national feet. The sooner she restores
the roots of her historical existence, spirituality, and
religion--disfigured, cut and trampled upon under the atheist Soviet
rule--the greater are the chances of her re-integration into the family
of free and prosperous nations.

As to the arrogant doomsayers, like Tayler, it may suffice to reply with
the Russian proverb: �Don�t spit in a well. You may need to drink from
it.� Poor and unsightly as the Russian well may now seem, it may yet
serve as a source of wellness and well-being not only to the Russians
but also to other nations.

Fortunately, not all foreign observers of Russia are as superficial,
haughty, presumptuous, and self-serving as Tayler. Some few combine
greater knowledge with insight and compassion. One of the few was Walter
Schubart, a German scholar who fled Nazi Germany to Latvia because he
refused to pander to russophobic and anti-Slav tenets of its racial
ideology. In 1938, he published his major book, Europa und die Seele des
Osten (Europe and the Soul of the East), in which he envisioned a fusion
of Western civilization with its �Eurasian� Russian variation, both of
which are derived, he argued, from the same Judeo-Christian tradition.
While fully aware that Russia under the Bolshevik rule �was in her death
throes,� Schubart was convinced that only [a reborn] Russia would be
capable of restoring a soul to modern mankind, wallowing in materialism,
consumerism, and power aggrandizement. Alas, as soon as Soviet troops
occupied Riga, Schubart and his Russian wife Vera, were arrested and
later perished in the Gulags.

Russia of today may not have fully recovered its soul, but it is a new
Russia of the kind in whose rebirth Schubart believed. Don�t count this
Russia out. It still controls the largest landmass, has great natural
and human resources, and nuclear arms. I believe it is in the interests
of the United States to see Russia become stronger. Contrary to Tayler�s
suggestion that Russia�s decline makes it �strategically irrelevant,�
I�d say that the weaker Russia becomes, the more difficult it would be
to safeguard its territorial integrity, and the more strategically
relevant for the United States would become the entire area Russia now
controls.

In his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(Simon & Schuster, 1997), Samuel Huntington, a Harvard professor,
described Russia as one separate civilization and �a civilizational
bloc, paralleling in many respects that of the West in Europe.� That
�bloc� exerts a magnetic pull not only over a number of Slavic and
neighboring countries. Russia may have lost its Soviet status as �a
superpower with global interest,� Huntington observed, but it is still
�a major power with regional and civilizational interests (pp.163-164)�.
He also suggested that the balance-of -powers politics of the past are
likely to be replaced, in the post-Cold War era, with building the
balance of civilizations. I think that this Harvard professor got it
right, and that�s what Western strategists should be thinking about each
time they look at Russia�s map.

We need Russia as a close friend, strong economic partner, and reliable
ally. Russia can yet become all those things. But this can be achieved
only when Russia proudly stands on her own feet, and we respect her
independence and the right to maintain her own identity. If the genius
of European civilization is in the West, its heart may well be in
Russia. One may see the United States as a Western, Euro-American, wing
of the Eagle of European civilization. Russia may be seen then as its
Euro-Asian wing. This wing is currently crippled. But it�s no  reason
for us to feel smug. In the long run, without the full extension of the
Eurasian wing, the Bird will not fly too far.

Was I too harsh in my criticism of the United States and too soft on
Russia? Perhaps. However, as a former Soviet dissenter, defector and
naturalized U.S. citizen I feel that my primary duty is to criticize my
adaptive country that offered me hospitality and protection when I
needed it most. However, when the people who threatened the free world
ruled the country of my origin, I did not shy away from criticizing
them.Democracy is never more in peril than in the moment it is taken for
granted.


W. George Krasnow (aka Vladislav Krasnov) is former Professor and
Director of Russian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International
Studies. He now runs Russia & America Goodwill Associates (RAGA)in
Washington: www.raga.org

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