From Stratfor. I have to pity Kostunica if this is true.
The Milosevic Extradition
Velvet Coup: Serb Rivals Gain Power Over Kostunica
Updated 2355 GMT, 010628
Summary
Behind the sudden extradition of former Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic, lies another event: the demise of the fragile coalition in
Belgrade. It is clear that the Yugoslav president was locked out of the
decision to extradite Milosevic. In Belgrade, Kostunica stands isolated.
Instead, the Serbian government appears to be increasing its control, turning
on both Milosevic and Kostunica. After nearly a century, the nation of
Yugoslavia is reaching the beginning of its end.
Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic (C) among several other Serbian
Government Ministers announces the government decision to extradite Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague June 28.
Analysis
As Yugoslavia reacts to the extradition of its former leader, a number of
signs are emerging indicating that the president of Yugoslavia, Vojislav
Kostunica, was in fact locked out of the momentous decision to finally
extradite the man who had ruled the country for a decade.
In the overnight hours between June 27 and June 28, 15 of 23 cabinet
ministers in Kostunica’s government met to discuss one topic: the extradition
of Milosevic to The Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity. One
important figure did not attend: Kostunica. Later Belgrade’s Radio B92
reported that the president had not even been invited to the meeting.
Once regarded by the West as a cooperative leader, Kostunica had been, in
fact, the last barrier to the extradition of Milosevic. Just hours before the
extradition – likely after the decision had been made – the Yugoslav Beta
news agency reported that Kostunica promised the Serbian Socialist Party –
Milosevic’s former party – that their former leader would not go to The
Hague until a high court, the Constitutional Court, ruled on the legality of
the decree ordering Milosevic to trial.
A velvet coup is sweeping aside Kostunica’s fragile coalition government.
Most of the coalition that put him in power eight months ago is arrayed
against the president; the support of the people appears to have been wide
but shallow. There is a group within the government of Serbia, one of only
two governments left in the federation, that is doing away with the
federation.
Serb Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic Led by the most powerful politician in
Belgrade today, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, this group now
includes 17 of the 18 parties that Kostunica has led. It is entirely legal,
under the Serbian Constitution, and the Serbian government is steadily
marginalizing the federal government into obsolescence.
This group of Serbs is now effectively in control of the most important
government offices, at the federal level, in important international missions
now ongoing, and the most important ministries at the federal level, such as
the interior and justice ministries. Djindjic controls the Yugoslav
delegation to the international donor conference in Brussels, which will
decide on up to $4.5 billion in economic aid.
It is economic aid, too, that is driving the effort to topple Kostunica – and
demonize Milosevic. The Yugoslav economy is in shambles, its output having
dropped some 40 percent since the 1999 war for Kosovo. Abroad, the
Serbian-led government has moved to revive trade with the former republics of
Yugoslavia in the past six months.
At home, the Serbian government is discovering new mass graves allegedly tied
to massacres in Kosovo, but conveniently hidden for more than two years. An
unnamed spokesperson in the interior ministry announced on June 28, just
before Milosevic was hustled to the airport, that the bodies of 36 ethnic
Albanians, nine of them children, had suddenly been discovered in a Belgrade
suburb, according to Blic, an independent news agency. The victims are
reportedly from Suva Reka, in Kosovo – the site of an alleged mass murder,
included in the indictment against Milosevic.
These findings cap a steady drip-drip-drip of evidence that has gradually
turned once loyal Serbs against Milosevic and effectively toward Djindjic. A
drumbeat has sounded throughout much of the Serb media. Just three days
before Milosevic was bundled up and shipped off, Beta news agency reported
the findings of a poll by the Alternatives Study Center (CPA). The confused
report claimed that half of Serbs now support Milosevic’s extradition, while
elsewhere it quoted CPA researchers as saying that public opinion has not
really shifted.
Beyond Belgrade: The Future of the Federation
In recent weeks, the debate over extraditing the former president has
revealed the deep fractures now cracking under the Yugoslav federation.
Unity has been shaky many times since Milosevic’s ouster in October.
Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party (SNP), a junior partner in the ruling
coalition, has threatened to pull out. The threats have largely been a
bargaining chip in as quest for equal status with Serbia in the federation
or, failing that, independence. Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic is
driving a campaign for independence, slowly building support. A referendum
could take shape within months.
But now, Serbs within the reform government increasingly favor dissolving the
federation. Technocrats backing Djindjic’s reform program want to make a
clean break with holdovers of the Milosevic regime, begin building a viable
market economy and create a democratic Serbia to integrate with Europe.
Throughout, Djindjic has held the upper hand over the federal president,
Kostunica.
Now, Deputy Prime Minster Zarko Korac, an ally of Djindjic, has gone so far
as to tell the BBC that Kostunica and his party were "quite isolated." As of
10:25 p.m. Belgrade time June 28 – more than six hours after Milosevic was
extradited – the Serbian government had yet to officially notify Kostunica of
the move, according to Reuters, which cited a source in the president’s
office.
The move against Kostunica and the federal government is carefully cloaked in
the legality of the Serbian Constitution. In 1990, Milosevic added a clause
to the republic’s constitution granting Serbia the right to reject any
federal law, decree or court decision if it clashed with Serbian interests.
Djindjic has shrewdly used that clause to bypass protections that Milosevic
built in for himself, later, in the federal constitution.
The Crisis That Now Confronts the West
Throughout the past several months, Western governments and human rights
groups have hailed extradition as a courageous step.
In fact, extradition now not only threatens the future of Yugoslavia as a
country but billions in Western aid and security in the tumultuous Balkans.
This reality is now settling into Serbia.
A spokesman for Montenegro’s ruling Democratic Party of Serbia, Igor Luksic,
told Radio B92 that Milosevic’s extradition said, "It’s high time to face
reality and accept that Serbia and Montenegro should be two independent
states." The independent Onasa news agency in Sarajevo quoted an unnamed
Western diplomat in Belgrade as saying, "I don’t see how they will be able to
avoid a government crisis."
Miodrag Zivkovic, leader of the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro, said the
extradition of Milosevic did not mark the first time such a decision was made
for the sake of a nation’s survival and for cash, according to I*Net news
service.
The collapse of the federation would mark the final fracture of the formerly
united Yugoslav state, a fragile entity knitted together after World War I
but ripped apart by bloody ethnic rivalries during the 1990s. The splitting
of the federation will have economic and political consequences for the
Balkans and internationally.
The United States and European Union will experience economic benefits,
finding it easier to stimulate regional development. Donor nations can better
enforce and reward two exclusive programs for combating corruption endemic in
both Serbia and Montenegro; in the past, federal officers could hamper the
process. Russia, on the other hand, will also lose a fair-weather ally when
Yugoslavia falls, isolating Russia from the politics of the region.
But chances of massive economic development are low. Instead, Serbia and
Montenegro are likely to become isolated debtor nations. Without access to
Montenegro's ports, Serbia's economy will become more a liability than an
asset to Europe. A lack of capital and a devastated infrastructure will make
Serbia the slower of the two to develop. Montenegro's economy has an
effective head start on Serbia and will likely draw more investors.
The situation in and around Albania, as a result, is likely to become more
problematic in the short term. A weakened Yugoslav military will be unable to
contain ethnic Albanian insurgents. Two years after NATO bombed Yugoslavia,
the alliance will find that Serbia and Montenegro will need protection from
the alliance.
To unsubscribe, write to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
