From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ira Straus) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2001 Subject: Putin-Bush and Russia-NATO Putin-Bush and Russia-NATO By Ira Straus There have been several recent statements about Russia joining NATO which are encouraging. In the public discussion, Fareed Zakaria of Foreign Affairs has written in Newsweek International that the goal should be to include Russia in NATO. Drawing out the strict logic of Bush's statements about NATO being open to every European democracy, he argued that they should and must lead to this conclusion. Michael McFaul of Carnegie has argued in the Washington Post that NATO must make clear that it is open to Russia. Steven Sestanovich has written the same in the New York Times, adding that Mr. Putin privately complained to the last Administration about the absence of any encouraging response from Western leaders to his statement last year about joining NATO. All of these eminent writers say that the West should go farther than it has thus far in indicating to Russia that it has real possibilities in NATO. This spate of articles is itself good news. Never before has there been so much constructive comment in the West on the idea of Russia joining NATO. Not even in 1991, when the new President Yeltsin sent a dramatic letter to NATO about joining, was there such a favorable response. The new Administration's statements in this regard have also been optimistically received. This is good, if it serves as encouragement for the Administration to proceed farther in this vein. However, the new Administration's actual statements to date go no farther than those of the Clinton Administration, if even that far. What one can be grateful for is that the President has rejected the pressures to slam the door in Russia's face and declare it out of bounds from NATO forever, and has instead reaffirmed the status quo: that the door of NATO is not closed to Russia and that it would be desirable for Russia to join on some unspecified distant future date. This is a vast improvement over some of the alternative rhetoric of recent weeks. However, it is still inadequate. The Russians have heard it for years. They have also heard all too many statements that make clear to him that it is not meant for real. Some other Administration statements on this subject follow in that second vein of making clear to Russians that they would be fools to have much hope. Colin Powell, Secretary of State, was asked whether Russia's Europeanization - of which the Bush Administration has spoken strongly in favor - would include joining NATO. He answered: "I think it's premature to even suggest something like that." (Reuters, June 17, 2001) Now, it is precisely "suggesting something like that" that is needed at this stage. Suggesting it, talking about it, discussing seriously the issues and problems involved, and beginning the process of making plans for it - this is needed here and now, so that people on both sides can see the way forward and know what they will have to do to resolve the problems meanwhile. Some people have been arguing that the small Eastern European states so badly need to be given a perspective that NATO must march into the Baltics so that their hopes in NATO expansion will not suffer some degree of disillusionment. While this is a weak argument for the case of the small states, it is a far better argument for the case of Russia. Russia needs a perspective of Europeanization in which it can have confidence, one that provides hope for it in this era, not one that leaves it in despair and isolation while everyone else is allowed to join. The only realistic perspective in this regard is to join NATO; the other Euro-Atlantic institutions are either too weak to make enough of a difference or else, in the case of the EU, too small to include Russia without losing their balance. Only NATO has both sufficient strength and sufficient size and ballast to be able to include Russia and anchor its European orientation. Secretary Powell also argued against any urgency in the question of Russia joining NATO, on the ground that Russia was not among the nine countries now officially aspiring to join and "I don't think he [Putin] quite said he wanted to join NATO." This was tone deaf: Putin recalled, in his public comments at the Summit, the political price he had paid for raising the question and getting rebuffed a year ago; he was hardly going to make an official application in the absence of evidence of a better response. He did express appreciation for the softening of the response he had received a year ago. A wise diplomat reads the signals between the lines and deciphers their full significance; Mr. Powell alas devoted his argument to discounting and cloaking the signals. A myth is going around the world of punditry that it was Madeleine Albright who rebuffed Putin on NATO last year. To be sure, it would not have been out of character for Ms. Albright; in her confirmation hearings before the Senate, she had made arguments against Russian membership in NATO which had the character of reasons for permanent exclusion of Russia. This was contrary to Administration policy, but it appointed her Secretary of State anyway. The reason seemed clear: she was a useful go-between to the Republicans in Congress. She was applauded by congressional Republicans particularly for her anti-Russian statements and for her UN-bashing. The most important rebuff to Putin, however, came not from Ms. Albright but from the new Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson himself. He said icily, "It is not on the agenda" when Putin asked "why not" have Russia join NATO. A few weeks later he modified that, to say that maybe it could get onto the agenda for serious discussion in 10-20 years' time. That was not good enough, but it was still a considerable improvement. It was a case of on-the-job learning. The serious discussion needs to begin today, so that people will be able to reach a sound judgment about the timeframe rather than just make arbitrary statements about 10 or 20 years. Also, so that they will have a perspective to fit their future steps into and an incentive to move toward the preferred result in whatever time it takes, whether 5 years or 20. Since Lord Robertson is still in office, no one wants to blame him; it is much safer to blame Ms. Albright. Further, since Mr. Bush is newly in office and people want to encourage him to be reasonable, everyone is playing the game of blaming it all on the Clinton Administration. The slightest hint of Clintonian normalcy from the Bush Administration gets praised as a major step forward over Clinton. There is nothing wrong with the political diplomacy in this; but there is something wrong with deceiving oneself. History is being rewritten, to the extent of threatening the ability to perceive reality. The reality is that, on these points for which Mr. Bush is being praised, he has only echoed Mr. Clinton. That echo is good news compared to the alternatives that many people were contemplating, but not yet good enough. There is plenty of space for a fresh new Administration to do better than the previous one, which was far from a stunning success in its Russia policy. If that promise is to be realized, the first faint steps away from rumors of an anti-Russia policy will need to be amplified into steps that go far beyond a renewal of Clintonian policy. Miroslav Antic, http://www.antic.org/ Serbian News Network - SNN [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.antic.org/
