I don't know what you mean by "erasure-coded". I am only talking about storing something the size of a private key - say, 2K - on three other laptops. Your own private key would be 2K and you would, on average, have 3 other keys - a grand total of 8K average. Not going to break the back of even the most limited modern storage.
But considering the complexity of implementing key-part-management (mostly on the restore side of the equation), I think that brute-forceable password encryption of the backed-up private key is the better idea. The automated brute-forcing script should be written for the XO, not for the server (although of course porting it would be easy). When creating your password, it should even give you a pregenerated default random password. If you just broke your XO and forgot (or never wrote down) your password, a few more hours of cracking once you get your new XO is a minor nuisance. And yet this simple step would cut down privacy invasions by orders of magnitude, IMO. On Tue, Feb 19, 2008 at 2:36 PM, Ivan Krstić < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Feb 19, 2008, at 3:32 PM, Jameson Chema Quinn wrote: > > That's a separate issue - at the simplest, you just store the > > encryption key on the first backup and only manually thereafter; a > > more complicated scheme, for implementing later, would break it into > > 5 parts of which any 3 would suffice, and store the same 2 parts on > > all the backups > > Collaborative erasure-coded backups are not a good idea for devices > with very limited storage, except in special cases. > > -- > Ivan Krstić <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> | http://radian.org > > _______________________________________________ > Sugar mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.laptop.org/listinfo/sugar >
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