-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Eben Eliason wrote: | In fact, this exploit could happen even without a launcher service. | Any activity that wants to could write the users private data to the | disk in a URL format, as an object, and give it a fun preview image. | When the later discovers and becomes curious about it, she'll open it | and send out her private data to whatever site the other activity | wanted. Is there something in place to prevent this that I'm unaware | of?
I would argue that there is no way around this, and that it should not be seen as an exploit. Users must understand that any object produced by an activity instance can potentially contain any information available to that instance at that time. The best we can do is to show the user which instances have written data in each object, and which objects those instances had access to. That list is the list of all private data that could potentially be enclosed in each object. This is relevant not only to HTTP access but also to Sharing. - --Ben -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.7 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFH/8cNUJT6e6HFtqQRAj8FAJ0bHSY+MZRUTIsWDikpqZ6BOVDq+gCeIX1Q QLCFODVjOiq2ZbRXGJvulPA= =id1g -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Sugar mailing list [email protected] http://lists.laptop.org/listinfo/sugar
