On Sat, 29 Jul 2006, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>!!! Unable to decode the following MIME section !!!
>Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1;
>       protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="VywGB/WGlW4DM4P8"
>Content-Disposition: inline
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>Content-Disposition: inline
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>On Sat, Jul 29, 2006 at 06:32:35AM -0000, Anonymous Freenet User wrote:
>> On Sat, 29 Jul 2006, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> >!!! Unable to decode the following MIME section !!!
>> >Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=3Dpgp-sha1;
>> >    protocol=3D"application/pgp-signature"; boundary=3D"MGYHOYXEY6WxJCY8"
>> >Content-Disposition: inline
>> personal note: I hate pgpmime, inline may be old fashioned, but it's more
>> compatible
>It's more standards compliant.

Perhaps, but useless to programs that do not understand pgp-mime.  Sadly, I
lack the skills to add this capability to Jack B. Nymble and I am entirely
too stubborn to change software from what has worked for me for years, thus
your msgs are not verifyable to me at all.

>> >
>> >You have to connect to a **0.7** node. Actually you have to connect to
>> >several. And yes, the content is different; it's an incompatible content
>> >reset.
>> This means that it's time to download all of your favorite 0.5 content and
>> re-insert it in 0.7 when it becomes possible.
>> On a related note...
>> If I set up a new 0.7 node, get a few refs and begin inserting content. am
>> I as anonymous in doing so as I am in 0.5? Is there any way to trace
>> content back to the node that inserted it?
>0.5 has security problems. 0.7 has security problems. Either way you are
>vulnerable primarily to those nodes you are directly connected to. Who
>are far fewer in 0.7, and who you hopefully already know, in 0.7.
>Whereas on 0.5 you may well be connected to the [insert bad guys].
>Hence the darknet model is safer - at least, it's safer from a distant
>adversary. It is less safe from the point of view of a personal
>betrayal. And it remains an explicit goal that it be impossible to trace
>the author of an insert, however if you happen to be directly connected
>to them, you have a good chance of busting them with a correlation
>attack or something similar, until we implement premix routing (in 0.8).
>Also there are a number of important features which are not implemented
>yet, and a variety of attacks are possible. One of the big ones is that
>we don't have proper encryption yet; connections are encrypted, but not
>authenticated yet, so they can be MITMed or spoofed. That will be fixed
>in the reasonably near future.

Thanks for the clarification.  That helps my decision of what to insert

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