Below is the latest statement from Dale Way, of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. According to him, although many are saying "it's over", he says it has hardly started. Robert Waldrop ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ From_: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sun Jan 2 21:03 CST 2000 Date: Sun, 02 Jan 2000 19:10:19 -0800 From: "Dale W.Way" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Roleigh Martin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: IEEE Y2K Chair: The Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung Roleigh, You know from my writings over the years that the rollover was being overblown as the most significant aspect of Y2K, even being made synonymous with it by many. (Recall my critique of Ed Yourdon's essay � Y2K End Game� you kindly published on your site.) The �rolloveritis� that gripped many is understandable in that nothing works like a deadline in getting people's attention and action. The early alarm-sounders of Y2K used this, but did not let go of it when appropriate because they were too often in transmit mode and not enough in receive mode. And when they were in receive mode, they listened to themselves too much, with �did you hear!� rumors ricocheting all around the world. The media also went strongly with this dramatic focus for obvious reasons. Then other people with no pretense to computer knowledge entered the game, often with other agendas lurking beneath the surface. They built platforms to stand on and decry all the horrible things that were POSSIBLE with �computer chips� being embedded everywhere. In the absence of real understanding of the multi-dimensional details (technological, historical, cultural and managerial) of the world of the physical control infrastructure, these misguided people did not bother to study and learn that it takes more than a computer chip (whatever that is) and a 00-year to make a Y2K error, let alone allow that error to build to a failure, let alone let that failure emerge into public visibility. The details have always shown that the PROBABLE in that world was much smaller and less threatening. This distinction was, to some extent by choice, beyond their understanding. The root of the word �science� is �skei-� to cut, split, �to separate one thing from another,� �to discern� (American Heritage Dictionary, 3rd Edition). The above people, whom I am painting with a broad brush not in every case justified, failed to discern the various dimensions of Y2K, one from another, and how those dimensions would combine into a more predictable reality. They too often lumped Y2K into one thing and attached their own hopes and fears to that monolithic notion. But there is another world that Y2K threatens that has gone undifferentiated by these people and much of the media as well. The Feds and other �powers that be� have not been so simple-minded. That is why you are seeing warnings that we are not out of the woods yet, that problems could still emerge in the near future. The reason is simple: We are leaving the world of LOW intrinsic vulnerability and HIGH remediation capability: the physical control system infrastructure -- for one of HIGH intrinsic vulnerability and LOW remediation capability: the data and information processing infrastructure. We are going from a world of engineering, based on scientific principals, to one of art or craft based on ever-changing business fashions (along with more stable, but still slowly changing accounting and other regulatory principals). We are going from one of lean, special-purpose technology tied tightly to the task it is -- to do to one of over-featured general-purpose technology adequate to many tasks it could be asked to do, but not particularly good at any one. We are going from a world of moderate size and limited interactive complexity -- to one of immense size and great interactive complexity. We are going from a world where most systems are very well understood -- to one where holistic understanding dims after one or two steps away from the element being examined at any one time. Where a �correct fix� here can bite over there, because the interdependencies were not understood and the testing infrastructure and time were inadequate to not only catch it and track it down, but to devise and retest a completely �safe� fix that would not bite somewhere else. I do not know what is going to happen. There is still much human organizations can do to mitigate and ameliorate errors and failures that do occur. Much will be held within organizations and not spill out into any kind of public view. Such things are not necessarily �reportable� in the crisis- management sense of things. But to the extent they occur, they will likely accumulate, to build up. If our collective ability to overcome them falls behind that occurrence rate, there will be disruption and damage, from processing slowdowns, to data loss or corruption, to serious system lockups. It will take a few months to really know. The fat lady has not even walked on the stage yet. Thank you for listening and posting this to your list. Dale W. Way Chairman, Year 2000 Technical Information Focus Group Technical Activities Board The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) To unsubscribe from SURVPC send a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with unsubscribe SURVPC in the body of the message. Also, trim this footer from any quoted replies.
