Author: kp
Date: Thu Mar 3 07:16:35 2016
New Revision: 296340
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/296340
Log:
MFC: r296025:
pf: Fix possible out-of-bounds write
In the DIOCRSETADDRS ioctl() handler we allocate a table for struct pfr_addrs,
which is processed in pfr_set_addrs(). At the users request we also provide
feedback on the deleted addresses, by storing them after the new list
('bcopy(&ad, addr + size + i, sizeof(ad));' in pfr_set_addrs()).
This means we write outside the bounds of the buffer we've just allocated.
We need to look at pfrio_size2 instead (i.e. the size the user reserved for
our
feedback). That'd allow a malicious user to specify a smaller pfrio_size2 than
pfrio_size though, in which case we'd still read outside of the allocated
buffer. Instead we allocate the largest of the two values.
Reported By: Paul J Murphy <p...@inetstat.net>
PR: 207463
Approved by: re (marius)
Modified:
stable/10/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_ioctl.c
Directory Properties:
stable/10/ (props changed)
Modified: stable/10/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_ioctl.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/10/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_ioctl.c Thu Mar 3 07:07:44 2016
(r296339)
+++ stable/10/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_ioctl.c Thu Mar 3 07:16:35 2016
(r296340)
@@ -2714,13 +2714,14 @@ DIOCCHANGEADDR_error:
case DIOCRSETADDRS: {
struct pfioc_table *io = (struct pfioc_table *)addr;
struct pfr_addr *pfras;
- size_t totlen;
+ size_t totlen, count;
if (io->pfrio_esize != sizeof(struct pfr_addr)) {
error = ENODEV;
break;
}
- totlen = io->pfrio_size * sizeof(struct pfr_addr);
+ count = max(io->pfrio_size, io->pfrio_size2);
+ totlen = count * sizeof(struct pfr_addr);
pfras = malloc(totlen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyin(io->pfrio_buffer, pfras, totlen);
if (error) {
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