You should not have that many instances of the same connection. It also seems 
these are both initiating and responding and all of these hang in quick mode, 
so phase 2 negotiation (rekeying)

Possibly your problems start when timing causes the end points to switch roles 
from initiating to responding. One common cause is pfs= mismatch where one end 
is tolerant for a mismatch. But perhaps in your case there is a bad selection 
of PSK when switching between initiating or responding. You can try setting 
rekey=no with ikelifetime= and salifetime= set to 24h and hope hst the Cisco 
will initiate to you for rekey. Or try the reverse and set the lifetimes to 45m 
to ensure libreswan always initiates before Cisco.

It looks like a Cisco bug

Paul

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jan 29, 2016, at 11:17, Rajeev Gaur <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Hi Paul
> 
> I have attached "ipsec status" output, do you feel the AUTH algos used here 
> could be an issue?
> 
> Thanks
> Rajeev
> 
>> On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 3:57 PM, Rajeev Gaur <[email protected]> wrote:
>> Hi Paul
>> 
>> One request here, did you had chance to look at 24 and 96 site logs?
>> Do you find this same behavior being depicted by the logs?
>> If yes, in that case, let me see and check "ipsec status".
>> But, if you find it different, please do suggest what difference you found.
>> Then, I will dig that matter.
>> 
>> Thanks
>> Rajeev
>> 
>>> On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 3:07 AM, Paul Wouters <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> On Tue, 26 Jan 2016, Rajeev Gaur wrote:
>>> 
>>> Hi Rajeev,
>>> 
>>> I wrote:
>>> 
>>>>       PAYLOAD_MALFORMED message is received quite sometimes.
>>>> 
>>>> That could be because the other end still has state which the restarted
>>>> end does not have.
>>>> 
>>>>       process_packet_tail() -> in_struct() -> [%s of %s has an unknown 
>>>> value = next payload type of ISAKMP Hash Payload has
>>>>       an unknown value: 201]
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> It usually signifies an error in PSK/crypto, so the entire message is
>>>> garbage. (you can tell too because 201 is not defined, although it
>>>> is in the space of "private use" numbers as listed at
>>>> 
>>>> http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipsec-registry/ipsec-registry.xhtml#ipsec-registry-21
>>>> 
>>>> [RG]:
>>>> As I found further the problem is at following place in 
>>>> programs/pluto/ikev1.c:
>>>> 
>>>>     if (!in_struct(&pd->payload, sd, &md->message_pbs,
>>>>                        &pd->pbs)) {
>>>>                 loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
>>>>                        "%smalformed payload in packet",
>>>>                        excuse);
>>>>                 status_update(STATE_PROBABLE_AUTH_FAILURE, 
>>>> ip_str(&md->sender), md->sender_port);
>>>>                 SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
>>>>                 return;
>>>>             }
>>>> 
>>>> What does the status_update as STATE_PROBABLE_AUTH_FAILURE mean here?
>>>> Also, I have checked and rechecked PSK and config, I did not found any 
>>>> issue?
>>>> Please suggest something here.
>>> 
>>> As I said, a mismatching AUTH can use this when using PSK, because the
>>> packet will just become something encrypted to the wrong PSK. So it is
>>> decrypted but then becomes nonsense, and we can only try to interpret
>>> it, which then fails on the first or second payload.
>>> 
>>> Paul
> 
> <sites_ipsec_status.txt>
_______________________________________________
Swan-dev mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.libreswan.org/mailman/listinfo/swan-dev

Reply via email to