On 12/13/08, Rob Mason <[email protected]> wrote: > > Please stop sending these messages > > > > ________________________________ > From: "[email protected]" > <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Sent: Saturday, 13 December, 2008 3:10:02 PM > Subject: SydPhil Digest, Vol 57, Issue 9 > > Send SydPhil mailing list submissions to > [email protected] > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.arts.usyd.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/sydphil > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > [email protected] > > You can reach the person managing the list at > [email protected] > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of SydPhil digest..." > Today's Topics: > > 1. Metaphysics Conference Program (Kristie Miller) > > > > -----Inline Message Follows----- > > > > > > Contingentism in Metaphysics > > > Dec 19-20, The University of Sydney Refectory, Main Quad. > > > Are there any contingent metaphysical truths? If so, what are they? How > should we determine which metaphysical claims we should expect to be modally > contingent, and which modally necessary? The topic of Baboons is unlikely to > arise, but the question of whether, if Baboons made metaphysical claims, > they ought to expect those claims to be necessary or contingent will. > > > This conference follows "persons by convention" to be held at the University > of Sydney 16-18 Dec. For details see the persons by convention website. > > > > > Timetable: > > > Dec 19 > > > 9.00 - 10.30 Jonathan Schaffer (ANU) > commentary by Raamy Majeed (USyd > > > The Laws of Metaphysics and the Limits of Possibility > > > What is the modal status of metaphysical disputes? I will argue that > metaphysical necessity is a restricted modality. This will enable me to > defend the 'intermediate' view that the paradigmatic metaphysical disputes > concern metaphysical necessities but conceptual contingencies. I will > conclude by considering some questions about what is metaphysically but not > conceptually necessary. > > > 10.30 - 11.00 Morning Tea > > > 11.00 - 12.30 Kristie Miller (USyd) > commentary by Dan Haggard (USyd) > > > Properties in a Contingentist's Domain > > > The notion that it might be contingent whether or not properties are > Aristotelian immanent universals, Platonic universals, tropes, or sets of > particulars related by primitive similarity relations, is a relatively new > and controversial one. Call this property contingentism. This paper is an > attempt to make sense of property contingentism. > > > 12.30 - 2.00 Lunch > > > 2.00 - 3.30 Neil McKinnon (Monash) > commentary by Sam Barron (USyd) > > > Modality and the Metaphysics of Time > > > I will discuss three views in the metaphysics of time, namely, presentism, > the growing universe, and eternalism. The bulk of the paper involves looking > at each of these views in turn. In each case, the most commonly deployed > philosophical objections will be examined, and I will ask whether they show > that the view in question is necessarily false. Thereafter, I ask if > Kripke/Putnam-style arguments can be deployed to show that whichever view > turns out to actually true, is necessarily true. Aside from the question of > modal status in the philosophy of time, I suggest a new way for the > presentist to think about what is involved when we say that something is > non-present, and a new response to the `no change' objection to eternalism. > > > 3.30 - 4.00 Afternoon Tea > > > 4.00 - 5.30 John Bigelow (Monash) > commentary by Aisling Crean (ANU) > > > > > Mereology, and my favourite things > > > > > Quine's epistemology works by roughly "inference to the best explanation". I > think pure mathematics does not work by inference to the best explanation: > but I will explore the hypothesis that metaphysics does. Under this > epistemology, it is an open question whether some of "the best explanations" > will turn out to be ones that include the postulation that some truths are > necessary, analytic, and a priori. I will take mereology as an example. > Mereology, as articulated by Quine and Goodman and Lenard, is very neat. I > will not question the principle that whenever there are some things, then > there is something that has all those things as parts. I will, however, > explore the question whether there might be explanatory muscles behind the > thesis that distinct things might have all their parts in common (eg. "a > ship" and "an aggregate of planks"). I will argue that Quine's own > epistemology might undermine both his mereology and his hostility to > modality, essentialism, analyticity, and the a priori. > > > Dec 20 > > > > > 9.00 - 10.30 Denis Robinson (Auckland) > commentary by Pete Evans (Usyd) > > > Looking through a small window into the fog (reflections on logical space > and metaphysical methods) > > > > Some well known metaphysical theses are overtly contingent, for instance > various contingent supervenience theses. They require some empirical > support, yet their philosophical appraisal may involve largely a prioristic > reasoning. Though contingent they may have metaphysically necessary > entailments as consequences. Though true with respect to all possible worlds > they only non-trivially constrain some of them: they concern metaphysical > issues which are overtly Metaphysically Local because involving features not > found in all possible worlds. > > Thus Metaphysical Necessity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for > a doctrine having Metaphysical Generality (i.e. non-trivially constraining > all possible worlds). The most interesting Contingentism versus > Necessitarianism debates will concern what purport to be such doctrines > (though they will not be if Contingentism is true of them). > I am sceptical about how much of what is discussed in metaphysics has > Metaphysical Generality, and also sceptical about how we could know if it > does. I will mention some reasons for thinking our modal epistemology is > unlikely to let us see far into modal space, and reflect on the possibility > that spatio-temporal structure as we know it is a feature which lacks > Metaphysical Generality. > > > 10.30 - 11.00 Morning Tea > > > 11.00 - 12.30 David Braddon-Mitchell (USyd) > commentary by David Rowe (Monash) > > > The Role of Contingency in Metaphysics. > > > I argue that the conditions under which distinctively metaphysical claims > could be contingent are unlikely to be fulfilled, and if fulfilled would > come at the cost of our having no reason to hold that any particular > metaphysical claim was true. On the other hand, meta-metaphysical views > which make sense of why we should prefer one metaphysics over another will > tend to metaphysically deflationary. Either they will involve the a priori > elimination of incoherent views allied to a hyperintensional account of > concept individuation, or else they will be a choice between metaphysically > equivalent theories based on how close in meaning the key terms are to > natural language usage. One further possibility remains, and which makes > sense of some key cases such as the mind-body problem, and Humean > supervenience. One might think that metaphysics is not a subject matter, it > a method. In particular it might using a priori methods to rule out a priori > objections to testable, empirical hypotheses. > > > 12.30 - 2.00 Lunch > > > 2.00 - 3.30 David Chalmers (ANU) (TBA) > commentary by John Cusbert (ANU). > > > 3.30 - 4.00 Afternoon Tea > > > 4.00 - 5.30 Metaphysics Panel (Ben Blumsen, Mark Jago, Ben Phillips) > > > > > Dr. Kristie Miller > University of Sydney Research Fellow > School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and > The Centre for Time > The University of Sydney > Sydney Australia > Room 411, A 18 > > > [email protected] > [email protected] > Ph: 02 93569663 > http://homepage.mac.com/centre.for.time/KristieMiller/Kristie/Home%20Page.html > > > > > > Dr. Kristie Miller > University of Sydney Research Fellow > School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and > The Centre for Time > The University of Sydney > Sydney Australia > Room 411, A 18 > > > [email protected] > [email protected] > Ph: 02 93569663 > http://homepage.mac.com/centre.for.time/KristieMiller/Kristie/Home%20Page.html > > > > > > > > > Contingentism in Metaphysics > > > Dec 19-20, The University of Sydney Refectory, Main Quad. > > > Are there any contingent metaphysical truths? If so, what are they? How > should we determine which metaphysical claims we should expect to be modally > contingent, and which modally necessary? The topic of Baboons is unlikely to > arise, but the question of whether, if Baboons made metaphysical claims, > they ought to expect those claims to be necessary or contingent will. > > > This conference follows "persons by convention" to be held at the University > of Sydney 16-18 Dec. For details see the persons by convention website. > > > > > Timetable: > > > Dec 19 > > > 9.00 - 10.30 Jonathan Schaffer (ANU) > commentary by Raamy Majeed (USyd > > > The Laws of Metaphysics and the Limits of Possibility > > > What is the modal status of metaphysical disputes? I will argue that > metaphysical necessity is a restricted modality. This will enable me to > defend the 'intermediate' view that the paradigmatic metaphysical disputes > concern metaphysical necessities but conceptual contingencies. I will > conclude by considering some questions about what is metaphysically but not > conceptually necessary. > > > 10.30 - 11.00 Morning Tea > > > 11.00 - 12.30 Kristie Miller (USyd) > commentary by Dan Haggard (USyd) > > > Properties in a Contingentist's Domain > > > The notion that it might be contingent whether or not properties are > Aristotelian immanent universals, Platonic universals, tropes, or sets of > particulars related by primitive similarity relations, is a relatively new > and controversial one. Call this property contingentism. This paper is an > attempt to make sense of property contingentism. > > > 12.30 - 2.00 Lunch > > > 2.00 - 3.30 Neil McKinnon (Monash) > commentary by Sam Barron (USyd) > > > Modality and the Metaphysics of Time > > > I will discuss three views in the metaphysics of time, namely, presentism, > the growing universe, and eternalism. The bulk of the paper involves looking > at each of these views in turn. In each case, the most commonly deployed > philosophical objections will be examined, and I will ask whether they show > that the view in question is necessarily false. Thereafter, I ask if > Kripke/Putnam-style arguments can be deployed to show that whichever view > turns out to actually true, is necessarily true. Aside from the question of > modal status in the philosophy of time, I suggest a new way for the > presentist to think about what is involved when we say that something is > non-present, and a new response to the `no change' objection to eternalism. > > > 3.30 - 4.00 Afternoon Tea > > > 4.00 - 5.30 John Bigelow (Monash) > commentary by Aisling Crean (ANU) > > > > > Mereology, and my favourite things > > > > > Quine's epistemology works by roughly "inference to the best explanation". I > think pure mathematics does not work by inference to the best explanation: > but I will explore the hypothesis that metaphysics does. Under this > epistemology, it is an open question whether some of "the best explanations" > will turn out to be ones that include the postulation that some truths are > necessary, analytic, and a priori. I will take mereology as an example. > Mereology, as articulated by Quine and Goodman and Lenard, is very neat. I > will not question the principle that whenever there are some things, then > there is something that has all those things as parts. I will, however, > explore the question whether there might be explanatory muscles behind the > thesis that distinct things might have all their parts in common (eg. "a > ship" and "an aggregate of planks"). I will argue that Quine's own > epistemology might undermine both his mereology and his hostility to > modality, essentialism, analyticity, and the a priori. > > > Dec 20 > > > > > 9.00 - 10.30 Denis Robinson (Auckland) > commentary by Pete Evans (Usyd) > > > Looking through a small window into the fog (reflections on logical space > and metaphysical methods) > > > > Some well known metaphysical theses are overtly contingent, for instance > various contingent supervenience theses. They require some empirical > support, yet their philosophical appraisal may involve largely a prioristic > reasoning. Though contingent they may have metaphysically necessary > entailments as consequences. Though true with respect to all possible worlds > they only non-trivially constrain some of them: they concern metaphysical > issues which are overtly Metaphysically Local because involving features not > found in all possible worlds. > > Thus Metaphysical Necessity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for > a doctrine having Metaphysical Generality (i.e. non-trivially constraining > all possible worlds). The most interesting Contingentism versus > Necessitarianism debates will concern what purport to be such doctrines > (though they will not be if Contingentism is true of them). > I am sceptical about how much of what is discussed in metaphysics has > Metaphysical Generality, and also sceptical about how we could know if it > does. I will mention some reasons for thinking our modal epistemology is > unlikely to let us see far into modal space, and reflect on the possibility > that spatio-temporal structure as we know it is a feature which lacks > Metaphysical Generality. > > > 10.30 - 11.00 Morning Tea > > > 11.00 - 12.30 David Braddon-Mitchell (USyd) > commentary by David Rowe (Monash) > > > The Role of Contingency in Metaphysics. > > > I argue that the conditions under which distinctively metaphysical claims > could be contingent are unlikely to be fulfilled, and if fulfilled would > come at the cost of our having no reason to hold that any particular > metaphysical claim was true. On the other hand, meta-metaphysical views > which make sense of why we should prefer one metaphysics over another will > tend to metaphysically deflationary. Either they will involve the a priori > elimination of incoherent views allied to a hyperintensional account of > concept individuation, or else they will be a choice between metaphysically > equivalent theories based on how close in meaning the key terms are to > natural language usage. One further possibility remains, and which makes > sense of some key cases such as the mind-body problem, and Humean > supervenience. One might think that metaphysics is not a subject matter, it > a method. In particular it might using a priori methods to rule out a priori > objections to testable, empirical hypotheses. > > > 12.30 - 2.00 Lunch > > > 2.00 - 3.30 David Chalmers (ANU) (TBA) > commentary by John Cusbert (ANU). > > > 3.30 - 4.00 Afternoon Tea > > > 4.00 - 5.30 Metaphysics Panel (Ben Blumsen, Mark Jago, Ben Phillips) > > > > > Dr. Kristie Miller > University of Sydney Research Fellow > School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and > The Centre for Time > The University of Sydney > Sydney Australia > Room 411, A 18 > > > [email protected] > [email protected] > Ph: 02 93569663 > http://homepage.mac.com/centre.for.time/KristieMiller/Kristie/Home%20Page.html > > > > > > Dr. Kristie Miller > University of Sydney Research Fellow > School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and > The Centre for Time > The University of Sydney > Sydney Australia > Room 411, A 18 > > > [email protected] > [email protected] > Ph: 02 93569663 > http://homepage.mac.com/centre.for.time/KristieMiller/Kristie/Home%20Page.html > > > > > _______________________________________________ > SydPhil mailing list > [email protected] > List Info: > http://lists.arts.usyd.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/sydphil > > NEW LIST ARCHIVE: > http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ > _______________________________________________ > SydPhil mailing list > [email protected] > List Info: > http://lists.arts.usyd.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/sydphil > > NEW LIST ARCHIVE: > http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ >
-- ARC Federation Fellow & Challis Professor of Philosophy Centre for Time Department of Philosophy Main Quad, A14 University of Sydney NSW 2006 Australia T: +61 2 9351 4057 F: +61 2 9351 3918 W: http://www.usyd.edu.au/time/ _______________________________________________ SydPhil mailing list [email protected] List Info: http://lists.arts.usyd.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/sydphil NEW LIST ARCHIVE: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/
