Paul Formosa from Macquarie will be delivering his paper 'Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?' (abstract attached) at KAPKI this Wednesday 5pm in the Philosophy Common Room Main Quad S413. All welcome.
The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained attack by those defending a realist reading of Kant's moral philosophy. Both sides claim to represent, or construct, the 'real' Kant. So is Kant a moral constructivist or a moral realist? In answering this question I argue, via a brief detour through Kant's transcendental idealism, that the decisive point of difference is whether or not our fundamental normative claims are based in realist receptivity or constructivist spontaneity. On the basis of this distinction I defend the claim that Kant is a moral constructivist. Next, I examine in greater detail the prominent constructivist accounts of John Rawls and Christine Korsgaard. In contrast to Korsgaard I argue that rational choice is not the source but only the condition of all value. Further, I defend the claim that the ends in themselves status of persons is a norm of pure rationality. Finally, I examine the recent realist attacks against constructivism made by Allen Wood and Patrick Kain and argue that their accounts neither support the view that Kant is a moral realist nor undermine the plausibility of Kantian constructivism.
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