Dear all, FYI, the Sydney portion of the notice below may be of interest.
____________ Raimond Gaita & The School of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University warmly invite you to the 2009 Simone Weil Lecture on Human Value – In Melbourne & Sydney “Knowledge and Prejudice” By Miranda Fricker MELBOURNE LECTURE: Wednesday 12th August 6.30pm, Christ Lecture Theatre, Australian Catholic University, Melbourne (St Patrick’s Campus) 115 Victoria Parade, Fitzroy Free, No Bookings Required For More Information: http://www.acu.edu.au/65303 Email: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Phone: 9953 3160 SYDNEY LECTURE: Tuesday 18th August 5.30pm for 6.00pm Dixson Room, Mitchell wing, State Library of NSW Cost: $15 (Friends, student concessions), $20 (seniors) $22, includes light refreshments Bookings Essential on 02 9273 1770 or [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> LECTURE ABSTRACT: When someone speaks but is not heard because of their accent, or their sex, or the colour of their skin, they suffer a distinctive form of injustice—they are undermined as a knower. This kind of injustice, which I call testimonial injustice, is not only an ethical problem but also a political one; for citizens are not free unless they get a fair hearing when they try to contest wrongful treatment. I shall argue that not only individuals but also public institutions need to have the virtue of testimonial justice. If our police, our juries and our complaints panels lack that virtue, then some groups cannot contest. And if you can’t do that, you do not have political freedom. Special Seminar with Miranda Fricker Melbourne & Sydney For Academics and Postgraduate Students MELBOURNE SEMINAR: “Can Institutions Have Virtues and Vices?” Thursday 13th August 6.30pm – 8.30pm, Australian Catholic University, Melbourne (St Patrick’s Campus) Seminar Room 5.29 Level 5, 115 Victoria Parade, Fitzroy Limit of 30 people – Free but Bookings Essential Email: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> or Phone 9953 3160 MELBOURNE SEMINAR ABSTRACT: There surely is such a thing as collective virtue. We often talk as though groups and collectives of various kinds—teams, appointments panels, juries, police forces—can display virtues or indeed vices. We might, for instance, describe a jury as ‘fair-minded’, or a research team as ‘scrupulous’, or a police force as ‘institutionally racist’. But what exactly are we doing when we say these things? Are groups and collectives virtuous only insofar as their individual members have the virtue; or is there an irreducibly collective way in which groups can possess virtues? I shall adapt Margaret Gilbert’s idea of a ‘plural subject’ to explain how collectives can have virtues, and then explain the possibility of virtuous or vicious institutions in terms of the virtues/vices of the individuals and collectives whose activities realize the procedures that define the institution. SYDNEY SEMINAR: “The Relativism of Blame” Monday 17th August (BOOKED OUT) 6:00pm - 8:00pm, Sumitomo Room, level 3, Macquarie St Wing, State Library of NSW Limit of 14 People – Free but Bookings Essential Email: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> or Phone: 02 9273 1770 SYDNEY SEMINAR ABSTRACT: Bernard Williams is a sceptic about moral objectivity (embracing instead a certain qualified moral relativism); and his attitude to blame too might be described as sceptical (he thought it often involved a certain ‘fantasy’). I shall explore some of the prima facie motivations within Williams’ philosophy for his relativism of distance, including his view of blame; and while I will conclude that there is nothing in his work that independently imposes moral relativism, there is something powerfully relativistic implicit in his remarks about blame. I will give my own account of quite what this is, arguing that blame has its own internal relativity: blameworthiness displays a relativity to the moral epistemic situation of the agent. This relativism of blame fits most naturally, however, in a moral objectivist frame, and should not be taken as motivating any wider moral relativism. Finally, I will make some open suggestions about forms of moral resentment we may properly hold in respect of historically distant agents—forms of moral disappointment. ABOUT THE SPEAKER: Miranda Fricker is Reader in Philosophy at Birkbeck, University of London. She is the author of Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (OUP, 2007). She co-edited The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy with Jennifer Hornsby (2000), and co-author of Reading Ethics, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). Miranda is highly respected for her contribution to ethics and feminist philosophy and is deeply interested in issues of power, social identity, and epistemic authority. Leonie Martino PA to Professor Raimond Gaita Australian Catholic University Limited Melbourne Campus (St Patrick's) Level 4, 250 Victoria Parade Locked Bag 4115 Fitzroy VIC 3065 Phone: +61 3 9953 3160 Fax: +61 3 9953 3325 Email: [email protected] ABN 15 050 192 660 / CRICOS Registration: 00004G, 00112C, 00873F, 00885B _______________________________________________ SydPhil mailing list: http://bit.ly/SydPhil 872 subscribers now served. To UNSUBSCRIBE, change your MEMBERSHIP OPTIONS, find ANSWERS TO COMMON PROBLEMS, or visit our ONLINE ARCHIVES, please go to the LIST INFORMATION PAGE: http://lists.arts.usyd.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/sydphil
