Patrice Philie (Ottowa) The Refectory, Main Quad, 3.30 - 5.30
Title: McDowell and Wittgenstein on Content. Abstract: The notion of content figures at the heart of John McDowell’s account of intentionality, as discussed, for instance, in his Woodbridge Lectures. This presentation aims at gaining a better understanding of McDowell’s account of intentionality by comparing McDowell’s notion of content with that of the later Wittgenstein. This comparison should, in addition, uncover some perplexing problems in McDowell’s account of intentionality. I will proceed as follows: after characterising McDowell’s notion of content, the relevance of mental states for explaining content will be discussed. This will allow us to evaluate the status of a philosophy of mind in McDowell and to point to a tension between his claim to be engaged in a ‘quietist’ enterprise and what he actually seems to be doing, if my analysis is correct. An attempt to find the roots of this tension concludes the presentation. (Pre-talk at 2PM in the Philosophy Common Room. All honours and graduate students are expected to attend the pre-talk; all others are also welcome.) *HUW PRICE* | ARC Federation Fellow & Challis Professor of Philosophy Centre for Time | SOPHI | Faculty of Arts THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY P Centre for Time, Main Quad A14, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia T +61 2 9351 4057 | F +61 2 9351 3918 E [email protected] | W http://sydney.edu.au/centre_for_time/
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