This is a reminder for:

Title: John Maier
A Dispositional Theory of Counterfactuals

A number of authors have suggested that disposition ascriptions (e.g. 'The glass is disposed to break when struck') should be reduced to counterfactuals (e.g. 'If the glass were struck it would break'), but several objections have been raised against the proposed reduction. I suggest that things may go the other way around: counterfactuals are to be reduced to a certain species of disposition ascription. This account illuminates the connection between disposition ascriptions and counterfactuals, and provides an account of counterfactuals that need not invoke the apparatus of possible worlds.
When: Mon 17 Oct 13:00 – 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney
Where: University of Sydney, philosophy common room
Calendar: Current Projects
Who:
    * [email protected] creator

Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzZnbzQ2aDlqNjRyMzJiOW42c3NqMmI5azZrcGs4YmExOGQwamNiOW42MTBqNGRpMThrcGthYzI1OGMgZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw

Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/

You are receiving this email at the account [email protected] because you set a reminder for this event on the calendar Current Projects.

You can change your reminders for specific events in the event details page in https://www.google.com/calendar/.
_______________________________________________
SydPhil mailing list: http://sydphil.info

1000+ subscribers now served!!

To UNSUBSCRIBE, change your MEMBERSHIP OPTIONS, find ANSWERS TO COMMON 
PROBLEMS, or visit our ONLINE ARCHIVES, please go to the LIST INFORMATION PAGE: 
http://sydphil.info

Reply via email to