UOW Philosophy Seminar Series, Spring 2015. All are welcome!
*Speaker*: Dr. Max Cappuccio (Cognitive Science Program, UAE University, United Arab Emirates) *Title*: Would you Upload your Mind on a Computer? Machine Functionalism and the Hard Problem of Content *Abstract*: These days many philosophers and cognitive scientists seem inclined to believe that it is just a matter of time before our civilization will eventually develop a safe and reliable procedure for “mind upload”, that is the technological process that would allow to transfer a human mind on a digital computer, hence securing immortality through a computational simulation. In the face of such optimism in the future developments of the cognitive sciences, there is a question that hunts our dreams of eternal life: would you really attempt to transfer your mind on a computer, if you had a chance to do it and the continuation of your life absolutely depended on it? Assuming that you are motivated to live as long as it is possible, your answer probably depends on the likelihood that the process of mind-upload is successful. Let’s assume that all the previous attempts of mind-upload *seem* successful: all the people who underwent it seem happily living a new life in a simulation run by a super-computer. However, even in that case, before pressing the button that starts the mind-upload procedure you may want to double-check that the meaning of “successful” is absolutely clear and that the terms of the deal contain no hidden surprises. In fact, there are at least two possibilities: the first possibility, is that the process is successful in creating a perfect replica of your cognitive system on the computer, the facto giving life to an AI that is absolutely identical to you. The problem is that, while this AI thinks, speaks, and recollects exactly like you do, it is actually not you. The second possibility is that the intelligence recreated on the computer is not just indistinguishable from yours, but it is actually yours: in fact, it is not just a replica of your mind; it is your mind, which has been permanently transferred from your brain-body system to a machine. Certainly, either result would represent a sensational technological success, but only the second possibility would offer a concrete prospect of survival. The first possibility, in fact, would imply either that there are two “you” in the world now, or that only your digital copy survived the mind-upload process, depending on whether your mind has been destroyed or not during the process. Needless to say, it is the second possibility that you are in interested in, if you want to live forever in your new digital identify, abandoning your old mortal body. Understanding what is actually going to happen to you makes a difference if you are facing a choice of the kind: either you refuse mind-upload and have only a few days left to live, or you venture to press the button that will start the mind-upload process, but you are not sure whether this will trigger the first or the second possibility. In this paper we are going to argue that the single most important factor in your decision to trust the mind-upload process or not is the strength of your conviction that minds are contentful representions: what we are going to show is that, if you unfailingly believe that your mind’s fundamental functions are constituted by ‘contents’, then you should feel optimistic about undergoing the mind-upload process. In fact, in that case, you would have reasons to believe that, if the process was successful, the uploaded mind would not be only qualitatively identical to yours, but also numerically the same. Vice versa, if you are skeptical about the widespread belief that the fundamental functioning of minds involve contentful representations, then you would have good reasons to have many second thoughts before pressing the button of the mind-upload machine. *When*: Wednesday 29 July *Time*: 3.30-5.00pm *Where*: 19.G015 *Contact*: Dr. Michael Kirchhoff (kirch...@uow.edu.au) Best, *Dr. Michael D. Kirchhoff * Lecturer in Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Enquiry Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts University of Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia
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