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Title: Jan Sprenger
Conditional Degrees of Belief
It is a commonplace in epistemology that degrees of belief should track
known chances. Various principles (e.g., the Principal Principle) formalize
this intuition. It is less clear, however, that the same equality holds for
conditional degrees of belief. This paper argues for a suppositional
interpretation of conditional degree of belief, which justifies the above
equality without relying on substantive chance-credence coordination
principles. As a result, our understanding of inductive inference with
probabilities has to be changed.
When: Wed 8 Mar 2017 13:00 – 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney
Calendar: Seminars
Who:
* Sam Shpall- creator
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