Dear all Tomorrow’s current projects seminar @ 3.00 in the Muniment Room will be Lok-Chi Chan giving the following paper:
Can the Russellian monist escape the epiphenomenalist’s paradox? Lok-Chi Chan University of Sydney Abstract: Russellian monism – an influential doctrine proposed by Russell (1927) – is roughly the view that physics can only ever tell us about the causal, dispositional, and spatiotemporal properties of physical entities and not their categorical (or intrinsic) properties, whereas our qualia are constituted by those categorical properties. In this paper, I will discuss the relation between Russellian monism and a seminal paradox facing epiphenomenalism, the paradox of phenomenal judgment. The paradox is (roughly) as follows: if epiphenomenalism is true – qualia are causally inefficacious – then any belief or memory about qualia, including epiphenomenalism itself, cannot be caused by qualia. For many writers, including Hawthrone (2001), Smart (2004), and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007), Russellian monism faces the same paradox as epiphenomenalism does. I will assess Chalmers (1996) and Seager’s (2009) defences of Russellian monism against the paradox, and will put forward a novel argument against those defences. All are welcome. Associate Professor Kristie Miller Senior ARC Research Fellow Joint Director, the Centre for Time School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and The Centre for Time The University of Sydney Sydney Australia Room S212, A 14 kmil...@usyd.edu.au kristie_mil...@yahoo.com Ph: +612 9036 9663 http://www.kristiemiller.net/KristieMiller2/Home_Page.html
--------- SydPhil mailing list To unsubscribe, change your membership options, find answers to common problems, or visit our online archives, please go to the list information page: https://mailman.sydney.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/sydphil
