Hi all,

Just a reminder below of the event this Friday:

Szymon Bogacz, a postgraduate student from ANU, will give a talk at USyd on the 
9th June at 3pm. It will be a hybrid event. Please find details and abstract 

There will be drinks/dinner following the talk at a nearby venue.

All welcome, and we look forward to seeing you there!


Time: 3:00-4:30 PM, 9th June (Fri)

In person: Seminar Room N494, the Quad

Zoom: https://uni-sydney.zoom.us/j/83453490326

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Presenter: Szymon Bogacz (ANU)

Alethic Paradoxes and Epistemology

According to a popular definition, a paradox is an apparently unacceptable 
conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently 
acceptable premises. In my talk, I will argue that this popular definition of a 
paradox conflates two distinct phenomena. On the one hand, a paradox is an 
argument or a proof: a series or a set of sentences or propositions. On the 
other hand, a paradox is reasoning or inference: a cognitive process of 
transitioning cognitive states. The conflation of these two distinct phenomena 
seems overlooked in the current studies of alethic paradoxes and has 
consequences for the methodology of answering or solving these paradoxes. I 
will argue that what it takes to answer or solve an alethic paradox can be 
understood in two distinct ways: logically (focusing on principles specifying 
what sentences or propositions semantically or syntactically imply what other 
sentences or propositions) and epistemologically (focusing on principles of 
reasoning specifying how one does or ought to form, maintain, and revise their 
cognitions). Using the liar paradox as an example of an alethic paradox, I will 
survey contemporary approaches to this paradox and argue that most of them 
understand the liar paradox to be an argument and propose logical solutions to 
this paradox. In contrast, epistemological approaches to alethic paradoxes 
remain underexplored yet may prove philosophically valuable.

Brigitte Everett and Wendy Xin

Philosophy Postgraduate Representatives

University of Sydney



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