> > It's not quite correct that we see your private key, even encrypted; but > it's close enough for these purposes. Mozilla could be compelled to > provide information that gives law enforcement a privileged attack on your > password. If you choose a strong password, this is as hard as breaking the > private keys that were used in Old Sync. >
It's worth noting that most of these theoretical noodlings converge on the same point: the point at which a government is able to compel Mozilla to attack your Firefox Account — that is, they know your email address and that you use Sync — is also the point at which they could attack you without bothering to do so. For example, we could theoretically be compelled to push out a point release or hotfix that leaks your credentials, or a government could compromise our stack without our cooperation, or you could be spearphished. If you use Android, for example, the government could compel Google to remotely install and run code on your Android device as root. As soon as code is running in your browser, or on your phone, they have all of the data that's in your Sync account without touching the server. If I were trying to get your browsing history, I would give up on attacking your Sync account as soon as I tried "hunter2" and "password" as the passwords, and I'd switch to more direct methods. This is a roundabout way of saying: security is much more than just encryption.
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