Hi all,
We have discussed a lot about SHA/DSA/RSA/MAC for securing syslog on small
systems.
My point was it should be possible to make a "more secure then nothing"
syslog for small systems. I think anybody agrees on that.
But, ... my suggestions was to do it with syslog-sign, as it is the most
simple security extension to syslog we have discussed until now.
As Jon pointed out, by doing this we have a huge risk of making -sign a lot
more complex and a lot less "beautiful" at it is.
We should do that! I fully agree with Jon.
So I have a new proposal.
First, I would like to suggest to minimise the change to -sign. Basically,
leave it the way it is. But make the key length variable. I don't see any
reason why the key length should be fixed (as it is now). The keylength can
be specified in the certificate blocks. Or even in the signature blocks.
The current (fixed) size is:
a) to long for small(er) systems
b) insecure, in some future time.
By making the key length a "variable", we allow "small" (but less secure)
keys, for small systems.
And, maybe even more important, allow an easy upgrade for "very secure"
extreme long keys. The will be needed somehow, someday. The RFC should
recommend an (minimum) key length; it should be the current one.
Second, I would like to propose to discuss an alternative "secure syslog",
especially for "small" systems. This could be a "syslog-mac", it could be a
kerborized one(if that is "small"), it could be something else. I have to
think about it more. But I'm willing to do so.
But I don't know iff this can be done within our charter (Chris, can you
answer this question?)
Greetings
PS, the text for XDHR will be submitted today.
--ALbert
sent mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED], to address me personal.
sent mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED], to address me for businesses
