On Wed, 2006-01-11 at 06:19 -0800, Chris Lonvick wrote: > Hi, > If we can get consensus that an in-packet authentication mechanism like > this is sufficient to meet our threat model, then we can decide if the > shared secret is sufficient (the REQUIRED mechanism), and/or if we want to > RECOMMEND a similar X.509 mechanism. That would require having each > syslog sender to have an X.509 certificate, and have those signed and > available. That just seems to me to be getting a bit far away from the > ease-of-use that makes syslog so easy to deploy.
I don't like this approach as this check does not prove authenticity as each device in the chain can regenerate the same checksum. So I fail to see how this adds to security compared to using hop-by-hop TLS with x.509 certificate checking as it requires the same trust in the involved devices. -- Bazsi _______________________________________________ Syslog mailing list [email protected] https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/syslog
