Hi WG, [speaking as co-chair]
As co-chair, I will need to advise Miao to remove support for generic certificates unless there is overwhelming WG consensus to keep them, and the explanation of why reuse of private keys is necessary will need to be compelling. Please read RFC4107 (which is short). There are ambiguities in the TLS document regarding who MUST authenticate that will need to be tightened up. As the email from Tom reflects, part of the problem is the ambiguity in the definition of relay; I think it needs to be made clearer in the -protocol- document that a relay is a receiver and is a sender, and clearer in the -tls- document that authentication is hop-by-hop. Personally, I think we should make authentication more mandatory than is currently described, but the WG needs to reach such a consensus. If we keep the optional authentication(s), then the WG should justify in the document why it makes "protocol sense" for the authentication(s) to be optional. The WG needs to develop the table showing how the various authentication options mitigate threats, especially MITM threats, and we should have text that describes this as well. Please work with Miao to address these issues. Thanks, David Harrington [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] co-chair, Syslog WG > -----Original Message----- > From: tom.petch [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2007 12:53 PM > To: Miao Fuyou; 'Sam Hartman'; [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Relays was Re: [Syslog] AD Review for > draft-ietf-syslog-transport-tls > > <inline> > > Tom Petch > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Miao Fuyou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: "'Sam Hartman'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2007 5:50 AM > Subject: RE: [Syslog] AD Review for draft-ietf-syslog-transport-tls > > > Hi Sam, > > > > Thanks for the review! My response is inline. > > > > Regards, > > Miao > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Sam Hartman [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2007 7:23 AM > > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > Subject: [Syslog] AD Review for draft-ietf-syslog-transport-tls > > > > > > Hi, folks. I had no comments on the UDP draft or the main > > > protocol draft so I have forwarded them to IETF last call. > > > > > > I do have some concerns with the TLS draft. > > > > <snip> > > > > > > > Are senders and relays required to have a certificate and to > > > use that certificate? > > > > > > > It is not required, but it is preferrable for some deployment where > > malicious senders may send lots of messages to overwhelm > the receiver. > > > Sam > > I have a slightly different view. To quote the I-D, where it says > "The sender/relay should initiate a connection to the receiver" > I take that as the sender initiates a connection to the > receiver if no relay is > present or to the relay (when present), the relay (when > present) initiates the > connection to the receiver (collector). Relay and receiver > become TLS Servers > and insofar as TLS Servers have certificates, the relay will have one! > > When the next paragraph says > "When a sender/ relay authenticates a receiver it MUST > validate the certificate" > I take that to mean that the sender authenticates the > receiver if no relay is > present or the sender authenticates the relay (when present) > and the relay > authenticates the receiver. > > relay and sender are TLS clients. > > I appreciate that this is hop by hop security and not ideal > end to end security. > > Tom Petch > > > --Sam > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Syslog mailing list > > > Syslog@lists.ietf.org > > > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/syslog > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Syslog mailing list > > Syslog@lists.ietf.org > > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/syslog > > > _______________________________________________ > Syslog mailing list > Syslog@lists.ietf.org > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/syslog > _______________________________________________ Syslog mailing list Syslog@lists.ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/syslog