On 06/20/2014 06:50 PM, Djalal Harouni wrote: > kdbus_policy_check_own_access() returns 0 if access is granted, > otherwise a negative errno. > > So fix this by returning 0. We did not hit this since callers were > checking negative values for errors.
Applied, thanks. Daniel > Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tix...@opendz.org> > --- > policy.c | 13 +++++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/policy.c b/policy.c > index d75c2ef..58ab6a5 100644 > --- a/policy.c > +++ b/policy.c > @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static int kdbus_policy_check_access(const struct > kdbus_policy_db_entry *e, > * @conn: The connection to check > * @name: The name to check > * > - * Return: t0 if the connection is allowed to own the name, -EPERM otherwise > + * Return: 0 if the connection is allowed to own the name, -EPERM otherwise > */ > int kdbus_policy_check_own_access(struct kdbus_policy_db *db, > const struct kdbus_conn *conn, > @@ -307,8 +307,17 @@ int kdbus_policy_check_talk_access(struct > kdbus_policy_db *db, > unsigned int hash = 0; > int ret; > > + /* > + * user->uid maps to a fsuid at the time of a KDBUS_CMD_HELLO > + * cmd, if they equal allow the TALK access, otherwise we > + * proceed and perform checks against current's cred. > + * > + * By using the user->uid check first we reduce the exposure to > + * creds changes. Privileged processes should be careful about > + * what to do with a file descriptor. > + */ > if (uid_eq(conn_src->user->uid, conn_dst->user->uid)) > - return true; > + return 0; > > /* > * If there was a positive match for these two connections before, > _______________________________________________ systemd-devel mailing list systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
