I find your argument to be strange. "The kernel has this functionality, please do not use it and rather reimplement it in every piece of userspace that ever needs it, because that's supposed to be more secure."
I simply don't buy your argument here. //D.S. On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 8:22 AM, Eric Biggers <ebigge...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hello, > > The latest systemd README and NEWS claim that the userspace interface to the > in-kernel hash algorithms (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH) is now required. > > I don't know how much thought was put into this decision, but I think it's a > mistake security-wise. AF_ALG sockets increase the kernel's attack surface by > allowing users to instantiate and use arbitrary crypto algorithms, in > combinations or ways which may not have been tested. Indeed, historically > there > have been a number of security vulnerabilities related to this feature, both > in > the API itself and in the various crypto modules. For this reason, I think > security-conscious users would prefer to have this kernel feature turned off. > > Why exactly does systemd suddenly need this feature? If it's really just to > compute hashes, then please do it in userspace instead. Unless systemd > *really* > needs to support using hardware crypto accelerators, there is no need to call > into the kernel just to compute hashes. Or at the very least, make the > dependency optional. > > Thanks! > > - Eric > _______________________________________________ > systemd-devel mailing list > systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org > https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel -- 8362 CB14 98AD 11EF CEB6 FA81 FCC3 7674 449E 3CFC _______________________________________________ systemd-devel mailing list systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
