On Fri, Sep 27, 2019 at 3:18 PM Alberto Ruiz <ar...@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > On Fri, Sep 27, 2019 at 12:50 PM Lennart Poettering <mzerq...@0pointer.de> > wrote: > >> On Mi, 25.09.19 16:50, Hans de Goede (hdego...@redhat.com) wrote: >> >> > Hi all, >> > >> > Currently, at least in Fedora, but I do not believe that this problem is >> > unique to Fedora, there are 2 problems with keymap handling in the >> > initrd. >> >> Hmm, why do you need a correct initrd in the early boot? I can see two >> reasons: >> >> 1. full disk encryption with the user typing in the password on the >> kbd. But isn't the answer to this to link the root OS to the tpm >> instead, and use user-keyed crypto only for $HOME? The OS itself >> doesn't need to be protected after all, everbody should have the >> same files there anyway, it's $HOME that needs protection. >> > > Some counterarguments here: > - The TPM does not protect you from someone stealing your entire laptop > and booting from external media, > It does, because one of the PCRs has the entire boot sequence embedded into it. If you seal the key and then boot something else, the TPM will refuse to unseal the key for you. The same can be applied to hash of the kernel image (and initrds, if someone patched systemd-boot to include them in PCR8), and/or to Secure Boot state as done by Windows. > - There are plenty of systems out there without a TPM module that Fedora > cares about > That's the main problem. Only two of my several still-reasonably-modern x64 machines have TPMs, and one of them is TPM 1.2 which requires the completely unmaintained Trousers stack. -- Mantas Mikulėnas
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